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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
by
Mike McColloch *
HIS Article reviews the most significant developments in Texas
constitutional and statutory criminal procedure during the last year
as reflected in opinions from the United States Supreme Court, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the various state courts of appeals.
Decisions in the survey period involved subtle refinements in some areas
and brought about substantial revisions in others. Particularly revealing
was judicial construction by the state courts of several salient provisions of
the Texas Constitution. These decisions manifested an increased inclination to follow the federal courts' lead in defining the scope of the state's
police power and the rights of an accused.
I.

ARREST AND SEARCH

The paramount decision in the arrest and search area during the survey
period came out of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates. I
This decision unexpectedly brought about the demise of the conventional
Aguilar two-pronged test 2 as the sine qua non for assessing the probable
cause sufficiency of an arrest or search warrant affidavit. 3 Twenty years
ago in the landmark opinion ofAguilar v. Texas 4 the Court established the
test for the sufficiency of an informant's information relied upon in seeking
a warrant. Under this test a magistrate must be informed of both some of
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Attorney at Law, Bruner, McColl, England, McColloch & McCurley, Dallas, Texas.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
2. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
3. The Court in Gates apologized for not addressing the issue of a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments on *he issues
addressed, the Court issued an order on Nov. 29, 1982, requesting the parties to address the
question:
[W]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . should to any extent be
modified so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained
in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with
the Fourth Amendment.
103 S. Ct. 436, 7 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1982). After entertaining briefs and arguments on this issue,
however, the Court determined that since this issue was "not pressed or passed upon" below,
it should not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to decide the question. Id at 2322, 76 L. Ed.
2d at 532; see Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160 (1945). The Court, therefore, concluded that it was constrained to
reserve consideration of engrafting a good faith exception onto the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 103 S. Ct. at 2325, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 540.
4. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
contraband was located where he claimed it was, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was
credible or his information was reliable. 5 These requirements became
popularly known as the basis of knowledge prong and the reliability or
credibility prong. Spinelli v. United States6 refined the Aguilar analysis by
holding that self-verifying detail contained within an informant's tip, or
independent police corroboration, could permit the magistrate to find that
the informant's conclusion was probably correct, and thus cure an otherwise deficient showing under Aguilar's first prong requirement. 7 Two decades of voluminous litigation ensued, and numerous corollaries, often
contradictory, evolved among the state courts and the federal circuits.
While each jurisdiction's set of rules on probable cause affidavits became
more technical and rigid, officers, magistrates, and attorneys were at least
provided with a helpful degree of concrete and specific guidance on these
otherwise elusive determinations.
Illinois v. Gates 8 vitiated the entire Aguilar-Spinelli body of law. In
Gates the Court decided to abandon the two-pronged test and replace it
with a totality of the circumstances analysis as suggested in opinions issued
prior to Aguilar and Spinelli.9 The Court explained the new standard as
5. Id. at 114.
6. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
7. Id. at 416. The Court specifically held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained sufficient detail to allow the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation
based merely on an individual's general reputation," then the magistrate could properly rely
upon it. The Court, however, concluded that the tip in Spinelli did not contain sufficient
detail to warrant such reliance. Id. at 416-17.
8. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). The tip in Gates came from an anonymous
informant in the form of a letter received by the Bloomingdale, Illinois, police department
on May 3, 1973. The letter stated that Sue and Lance Gates lived on a certain street in
Bloomingdale and bought drugs in Florida. The letter alleged that Sue drove the car to
Florida with some regularity, where she left it to be loaded with drugs. Lance would fly to
Florida and drive the car back to Illinois. The letter further stated that on May 3 Sue would
drive to Florida again and that Lance would fly down a few days later to drive the car back.
The informants's letter concluded that Lance would have over $100,000 in drugs in the trunk
of the car during the drive back from Florida, and that a similar amount of drugs could be
presently found in their Illinois basement. The police pursued the tip and found that an
Illinois driver's license was issued to one Lance Gates, residing at an address in Bloomingdale. It was further discovered that a reservation had been made by an "L. Gates" on a
flight two days later from Chicago to Florida. Surveillance showed that Gates made the
flight, and that upon arrival in Florida took a taxi to a nearby motel where he went to a
room registered to one Susan Gates. Lance and an unidentified woman left the motel the
next morning in an automobile bearing Illinois license plates and heading northward. In
addition, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent informed the police that the license
plate number on the northbound automobile was registered to another car owned by Gates.
These facts were set forth in the warrant affidavit to search the Gates's residence and automobile. Rather than immediately executing the warrant, the police awaited the Gates's
arrival in Bloomingdale. Upon their arrival the police searched the trunk of the car and
uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the Gates's home revealed
marijuana, weapons, and other contraband. The Illinois circuit court ordered all of these
items suppressed. Its decision was affirmed by the Illinois appellate court and by a divided
vote of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Id at 2319, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 533.
9. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (test is commonsensical
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follows:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing]"
that probable cause existed.' 0
While the Court declared that the Gates formulation was a "flexible, easily
applied standard," it conceded that "[t]here are so many variables in the
probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a useful
'precedent' for another.''' The Court's solution for this predicament is
perhaps revealed in its recitation of the traditional rule that a magistrate's
"determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts"' 2 and that "the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in
this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to
warrants."13
Gates, however, did not render the principles set forth inAguilar and its
progeny completely useless. On the contrary, the Aguilar principles,
though not independently analyzed elements, are still highly relevant considerations in the probable cause determination. A deficiency in one element may be compensated for by a strong showing as to the other, or by
other indicia of reliability." 4 While the Aguilar rule is no longer the exclusive litmus test for these types of probable cause equations, it remains a
logical starting place for the bench and bar in making such determinations.
The essence of Gates, then, is that the Aguilar analysis should be applied in
a slightly less exacting manner; a technical deficiency in one or both
prongs should not necessarily be an absolute bar to a finding of validity if
corroboration, self-verifying detail, or similar circumstances are present to
5
buttress the conclusion that the affidavit's information is reliable.'
and realistic); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960); see also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (court looked to "factual and practical considerations of

everyday life").
10. 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548.
11. Id. at 2332 n.ll, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548 n.ll.

12. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
13. 103 S. Ct. at 2331 n.10, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 547 n.10;see United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 109 (1965). The Gates decision reflects both a "desire to encourage use of the
warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once a warrant has been obtained,
intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise
may be the case." 103 S. Ct. at 2331 n.10, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 547 n.10.
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2329, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 545.
15. The Court's opinion was penned by Justice Rehnquist, and was joined by four other
members of the Court. Justice White concurred in the judgment, objecting to the Court's
refusal to consider and adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 103 S. Ct. at
2336-51, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 553-7 1. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, on
the ground that the rejection of the two-pronged test was "unjustified and ill advised." 103
S. Ct. at 2351-59, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 571-82. Justice Stevens, also joined by Justice Brennan,
dissented on the basis that the warrant was defective even under the Court's new totality of
the circumstances approach, and complained that the Court should have merely vacated the
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How the Texas courts will interpret and apply Gates is difficult to predict. Only two recent cases provide any guidance. The court of criminal
appeals' per curiam opinion in Bellah v. State 16 followed closely upon the
heels of Gates. The arrest warrant affidavit' 7 in Bellah stated that an unnamed informant told the police officer affiant that the defendant had confessed the details of his involvement in a killing to the informant the
morning after the murder had occurred. The details described matched
other information in the officer's possession concerning the cause of death.
The court, unfortunately, offered little enlightenment on its approach to
Gates. It merely concluded that, "[g]iven [the officer's] statements and
others in the affidavit, as set out in the opinion by the court of appeals, and
taking the 'totality of the circumstances approach' endorsed in Gates, we
find no Fourth Amendment violation."18
The fact that Bellah was decided strictly on federal constitutional
grounds left open the question of whether the Gates approach would be
adopted as a matter of Texas statutory or constitutional law. State courts
and legislatures are free to accept federal holdings or set for themselves
whatever standards they deem appropriate so long as the state action does
not fall below the minimum standards of protection provided by the federal constitution. 19 In the past, the State of Texas has established more
liberal and protective restrictions, such as enacting a statutory exclusionary
rule long before the federal exclusionary rule was made applicable to the
states.2 O Texas constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures is embodied in article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, 2'
with identical language carried over into article 1.06 of the Code of Crimijudgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the Court's intervening decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Under the
Ross holding the search of Gates's car might have been valid if the officers had probable
cause after the Gateses arrived home. 103 S. Ct. at 2361-62, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 584-85 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
16. 653 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
17. Although Gates involved a search warrant, its probable cause rationale is equally
applicable to arrest warrant affidavits. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971).
18. 653 S.W.2d at 796. The court in Bellah made it clear that its decision applying
Gates was based solely on fourth amendment grounds and was not rendered as a matter of
state constitutional or statutory law. The court determined that the defendant had not attacked the affidavit on state grounds, despite the fact that he had cited the appropriate Texas
constitutional and statutory provisions in his motion to suppress in the trial court and in his
brief on appeal. Id. at 795.
19. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
20. The federal exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). Other protections in Texas law that are more extensive than the corresponding federal provisions are the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases, afforded by TEX.
CONST. art. I, section 10, and the requirement of unanimity in criminal jury verdicts, embodied in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.04-.05 (Vernon 1981). The Supreme Court has
held that the federal constitution does not mandate a jury trial for certain misdemeanors, see
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970), and that unanimous jury verdicts are no
longer constitutionally required, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972).
21. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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nal Procedure. 22 Moreover, the legislature enacted specific rules for the
issuance of search warrants, which are also contained in the Code of Crim23
inal Procedure.
In Hennessey v. State,24 however, a two-judge panel issued an opinion
basing its decision on Gates in applying Texas statutory law. The defendant in Hennessey specifically relied on article 18.01(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as well as the fourth amendment of the federal constitution. The court held, again with little discussion, that the totality of the
circumstances analysis of Illinois v. Gates should be used. 25 Hennessey
demonstrated, however, that the Aguilar mode of analysis remains viable
despite the court's apparent decision to adopt the Gates approach as a matter of Texas statutory law. While claiming to execute the totality of the
circumstances approach, the Texas court extensively analyzed the affidavit
in question using familiar principles that had evolved under the two-pronged test.2 6 The Hennessey court implied that theAguilar-Spinelli doctrine
had not been abolished in Gates, observing that the Supreme Court had
27
merely criticized its strict application.
The notion that the state constitutional provisions in article I, section 9
might provide greater protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures than that required by the federal constitution was dealt a potentially fatal blow by the court of criminal appeals in Brown v. State.28 The
court's original opinion, holding a police officer's seizure of opaque ballons
impermissible under the fourth amendment plain view doctrine, 29 was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. 30 On remand, the appellant
requested the court of criminal appeals to determine whether article I, section 9 would nevertheless provide an independent basis to support suppression. 3' The result was a sweeping pronouncement that sharply divided
the court. A plurality declared that it is "not the function of the judiciary"
to interpret the state constitution any differently than the Supreme Court
has interpreted the federal constitution, at least with regard to search and
seizure issues. 32 This revelation was said to have resulted from the plurality's belief that because the Texas courts had interpreted the state constitu22. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06 (Vernon 1977).

23. Id. arts. 18.01-.20 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1984). Id. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon 1977)
provides:
No search warrant shall issue for any purpose in this state unless sufficient
facts are first presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause
does in fact exist for its issuance. A sworn affidavit setting forth substantial
facts establishing probable cause shall be filed in every instance in which a
search warrant is requested.
24. No. 63,270 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 1983).
25. Id., slip op. at 3.
26. Id. at 3-8. The court would likely have reached the same result prior to Gates.
27. Id. at 2.
28. No. 65,431 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 1983).
29. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
30. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1544, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 515 (1983).
31. No. 65,431, slip op. at I.
32. Id. at 2. The opinion was written by Judge McCormick and was joined by Judges
W.C. Davis, T. Davis, and Campbell.
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tion in substantial harmony with the Supreme Court's opinions
interpreting the fourth amendment for many years, any additional (or different) search and seizure protections could be obtained only through constitutional amendments and legislative enactments. 33 To hold otherwise,
according to the opinion, would'34 permit the "judiciary to engraft such
changes upon our Constitution.
The plurality's opinion, which would destroy any independent meaning
or purpose to article I, section 9, predictably evoked bitter responses from
other members of the court. The dissent complained that the plurality had
reduced the court of criminal appeals to "the role of being nothing more
35
than mimicking court jesters of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The concurring opinion rebuked the plurality for "irrationally" and unnecessarily arriving at a "dangerous abdication of judicial duties and responsibilities as Judges of this Court. '36 The precedential value of Brown
is unclear, however, because the court has never before indicated that it
would construe article 1, section 9 to mean only what the fourth amendment means, 37 and because this novel precept is apparently maintained by
only four members of the court. Brown's potential implications are extensive. 38 Its underlying thesis sharply contrasts with the court's past expres39
sions of judicial independence concerning state constitutional standards.
Nevertheless, in light of Hennessey and Brown, it is probably safe to conclude that the Texas Constitution does not require any stricter interpretation of probable cause than the totality of the circumstances approach to
the fourth amendment now mandated by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's pre-remand opinion in Brown is of considerable
significance in its own right with regard to the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement. 40 Generally, the plain view doctrine permits the
33. Id.The court cited as its sole precedent Crowell v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 299, 180
S.W.2d 343 (1944). Crowell, never previously cited, contained the dictum, "Art. 1,Sec. 9,of
the Constitution of this State, and the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution are, in all
material aspects, the same." Id. at 304, 180 S.W.2d at 346.
34. No. 65,431, slip op. at 2.
35. Id. at 7 (Teague, J.,
dissenting).
36. Id. at 102 (Clinton, J., concurring).
37. See Dawson, State-Created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure:. A Study ofthe
Texas Experience, 59 TEX. L.REV. 191, 215 (1981).
38. Implicit in the court's holding is the notion that the judiciary must abstain from ever
altering a previously established rule of construction of the state constitution. The broad
language contained in the opinion is certainly susceptible to the interpretation that the court
has adopted an unqualified and absolute doctrine of stare decisis. One can only speculate as
to how long the court could operate under such self-imposed restriction, in this or any other
context.
39. While federal constitutional safeguards applicable to the states do establish a
minimum standard for state courts, such courts are not limited to those standards in construction of federal or state rights. They may go further and provide greater safeguards. . . . [A]s to the true scope of the Texas Constitution,
we must ultimately follow our own lights. "This approach is more desirable
than simply second-guessing future supreme court decisions."
Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (quoting Baernstein, Criminal
Law and Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 237, 241 (1967)).
40. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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warrantless seizure of property by police if three requirements are satisfied:
(1) the police officer must be engaged in a lawful initial intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view the object to be
seized; (2) the officer must discover the object inadvertently; and (3) it must
be immediately apparent to the officer that the object he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. 4 ' The
Supreme Court dealt with the third requirement of the plain view doctrine
in Texas v. Brown.42
A Fort Worth police officer lawfully stopped Brown's automobile at
night at a routine driver's license checkpoint, and asked for the defendant's
license. The officer shined his flashlight into the car and saw an opaque,
green party balloon, knotted near the tip, fall from the defendant's hand to
the seat beside him. The officer testified that because of his previous experience in arrests for drug offenses, he was aware that drugs were frequently
packaged in balloons like the one in the defendant's hand. When the officer saw the ballon, he shifted position to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove compartment, which the defendant had opened to look for
his driver's license. The glove compartment contained several small
plastic vials, quantities of a loose white powder, and an open bag of party
balloons. The officer seized the balloon, which turned out to contain heroin. The court of criminal appeals reversed the defendant's conviction on
the ground that the "immediately apparent" requirement of the plain view
doctrine had not been met because the officer did not "know" that " 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized the balloon.' "43
In reversing the court of criminal appeals, the United States Supreme
Court observed that its earlier use of the phrase "immediately apparent"
was "very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an application of the 'plain view'
doctrine." 44 The Court thus held that there is no need for the officer to
know that an item is contraband or fruits of a crime in order to permit a
seizure under the plain view doctrine.45 If under all of the circumstances
the officer's observations, coupled with his prior knowledge and experience, are sufficient to lead to the reasonable conclusion that the object is
probably contraband, the immediately apparent requirement is satisfied.
The fact that the officer in Brown could not see through the opaque balloon was of no constitutional significance, since his experience vested him
with knowledge that balloons tied in that manner were frequently used to
carry narcotics, and because the contents of the glove compartment re41.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-69 (1971) (quoting DeLao v. State,

550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
42. 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).
43. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 1542, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513. The Court thereby reaffirmed the rule set
forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980), that "[tihe seizure of property in
plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that
there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514.
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vealed "further suggestions that Brown was '46engaged in activities that
might involve possession of illicit substances."
The court of criminal appeals reached the same result under a similar
analysis in another balloon case. In Gonzales v. State47 the court held that
an officer is authorized to rely on his knowledge and training, whether
gained from on-the-job training, formal training, or personal experience in
the field. 48 The defendant in Gonzales was involved in a minor automobile accident. Two police officers, while questioning the defendant, noticed that he appeared under the influence of some kind of intoxicant,
though they could not smell liquor on his breath. The officers observed
several tiny, tied-off balloons under the defendant's tongue. Believing that
the defendant was in possession of heroin, the officers seized both the defendant and his balloons. The officers testified at the suppression hearing
that, although they had never arrested a person under such circumstances
before, their police department training taught them that heroin is often
carried under the tongue in tiny balloons so that the evidence can be swallowed in the event of police apprehension. 4 9 The court held that the officers' observations of the defendant and his attempt to hide the balloons
in his mouth, "coupled with their knowledge of the use of balloons to carry
heroin in the manner observed, were sufficient to authorize [the defendant's] immediate arrest and the50contemporaneous seizure of the balloons,"
under the plain view doctrine.
Although the courts generally have wrestled with balloon seizures under
the troublesome plain view requirements, the validity of these recurring
seizures might be more appropriately resolved pursuant to other recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The inherent problem of the
plain view doctrine was revealed at its inception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire5 l when the Supreme Court observed that "it is important to keep in
mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police
will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure," simply as "the
normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal."152 Because the imme46. Id., 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, characterized
the fact that the officer could not see through the balloon as "all but irrelevant." Id
47. 648 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
48. Id. at 687.
49. Id The court of appeals, relying on the original opinion in Brown as well as Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (officer must have specialized
knowledge), and DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (officer failed to
testify he was cognizant of drug practice), held the warrantless seizure of the balloon illegal
because of the officer's lack of any personal experience with this type of drug packaging.
The court of appeals found no suspicious facts and circumstances to further justify the
seizure. Gonzales v. State, No. 04-81-00129-CR (Tex. App.-San Antonio, June 30, 1982).
50. 648 S.W.2d at 687. Although the court in Gonzales did not expressly dispose of this
issue under the plain view doctrine, its discussion of the court of appeals' opinion and the
dissent by Judge Clinton clearly indicate that the holding was based on the court's interpretation of the immediately apparent aspect of the doctrine.
51. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
52. Id at 465 (emphasis in original).
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diately apparent aspect requires a showing of probable cause, 53 or at least
reasonable suspicion, 54 cases such as Gonzales might be more appropri55
ately analyzed in light of exceptions involving the automobile search,
57 or stop and frisk.5 8
56
search incident to arrest, exigent circumstances,
Since the police officers in Gonzales had probable cause to arrest the defendant and, in fact, had arrested him at the moment the balloons were
taken, the seizure could be justified as a search incident to arrest, regardless of the fact that the balloons were in the officers' plain view. 59
Not surprisingly, stops and searches of automobiles continue to be a primary source of revision of fourth amendment principles by courts at all
levels. In Terry v. Ohio 60 the Supreme Court authorized the limited "stopand-frisk" or "pat-down" search of persons an officer reasonably suspects
of criminal activity in circumstances where the officer has a reasonable
fear for his safety. Terry was limited by its own terms to searches for
weapons, and authorized intrusion only into the outer clothing of persons
reasonably believed to be presently dangerous. 6 1 The Court has now extended this concept to permit, in essence, a "frisk" of the interior of an
automobile out of which such a person has just emerged. In Michigan v.
Long 62 two police officers on night patrol in a rural area observed a car
traveling erratically and at an excessive speed. The car swerved into a
ditch and the officers stopped to investigate, finding the defendant the sole
occupant of the car. The defendant appeared to the officers to be under
the influence of something, and failed to respond to the officers' initial
request to produce his license and registration. The defendant began
53. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. I, 2-3 (1980); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 602-03 (1980).
54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether a degree of suspicion less than probable cause would, in some
circumstances, be a sufficient basis for a seizure under the plain view doctrine. Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1542 n.7, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 513-14 n.7.
55. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
56. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
57. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
58. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
59. See 648 S.W.2d at 687-88 (Clinton, J., dissenting). For other search incident to
arrest cases, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (drugs discovered during search of
car and occupants); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest by
postal officers of suspected credit card thief).
60. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
61. The Court expressed its holding as follows:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear of his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.
Id at 30.
62. 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
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walking toward the open door of the car, apparently to get his registration.
The officers followed the defendant and observed a hunting knife on the
floorboard of the car. The officers then stopped the defendant and subjected him to a Terry frisk, which revealed no weapons. One of the officers
then shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle to look for other
weapons, and noticed that an object was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat.63 He then entered the vehicle and lifted the armrest.
This revealed an open pouch of marijuana on the front seat. The Court
decided that these facts, the principles established in Terry, and the recognition that "investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers,"' 64 compelled the following
conclusion:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited
to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons ...
"[TIhe balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of
allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable
and objectively
reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially
65
dangerous.
The adoption of an area search rule is a significant illustration of the
Court's current gravitation toward minimizing restrictions on police conduct in the fourth amendment context. The Court found justification for
the area search rule in precedents establishing the authority to search incident to arrest, permissible only subsequent to a valid arrest on probable
cause. 66 The result in Long is ostensibly a logical evolutionary expansion
of New York v. Belton ,67 in which the Court recently held that "when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile" for weapons or evidence. 6 8 In
Terry, however, the Court expressly recognized the difference between a
63. This action did not constitute a search. The Court has long held that the "use of a

searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by
the Constitution." United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); see also United States v.

Lara, 517 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (use of searchlight does not preclude application of
plain view doctrine).
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3479, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1218; see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
108-09 (1977) (citizen's personal safety governs invasion of privacy); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (reasonableness under the circumstances).
65. 103 S.Ct. at 3480-81, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220-21 (footnotes omitted).
66. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (presume arrest valid before
determining proper scope of search incident to arrest).
67. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
68. Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted).
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search incident to arrest and the limited search for weapons involved in a
frisk based merely on a reasonable suspicion. 6 9 The Court in Long
stressed that the instant search was not unreasonable because it was conducted to insure that no other weapons were within the defendant's immediate grasp or immediate control. 70 Nevertheless, the Court pronounced an
expanded rule allowing a "search incident to reasonable suspicion" of the
entire passenger compartment of the automobile. Indeed, the limitation
expressed by the majority suggests little restriction at all: the search is allowed to 7extend to all "those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden."

1

II.

CONFESSIONS

In 1981 the United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith 72 held that
the State's use of psychiatric testimony at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial violated the accused's fifth and sixth amendment rights
when Miranda warnings were not administered at the psychiatric examination. 73 The Court reasoned that the principles underlying Miranda v. Arizona 74 applied equally to court ordered pretrial psychiatric examinations
as well as to custodial interrogations. In holding that the fifth amendment
applies to both the penalty and guilt phases of a trial, the Court reasoned
that "U]ust as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from
being made '"the deluded instrument of his own conviction,' ". . . it protects him as well from being made the 'deluded instrument' of his own
execution. '75 The Court also concluded that the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was denied because the ultimate significance of the psychiatric interview, which proved to have
occurred at a critical stage of the aggregate proceedings, was not disclosed
to the defendant. 76 The Court explained that "the decision to be made
regarding the proposed psychiatric evaluation is 'literally a life or death
matter' and is 'difficult . . . even for an attorney' . . . . [A] defendant

should not be forced to resolve such an important issue without the 'guiding hand of counsel.'
Subsequent to Smith it became popular for prosecutors to address hypothetical questions to psychiatrists in proving up the special issue on future
dangerousness. The expert's opinion would thereby not be directly based
on the defendant's uncounseled statements made during the prior inter",77

69. 392 U.S. at 25.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220-21.
71. Id at 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220.
72. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
73. Id at 473. The psychiatric testimony in question concerned the issue of future dang rousness, even though the original purpose of the psychiatric examination was to ascertain
the defendant's competency to stand trial.
74. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
75. 451 U.S. at 462 (citations omitted).
76. 451 U.S. at 470.
77. Id. at 471 (quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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view. White v. Estelle, 7s however, placed significant limitations on this
practice. White, the petitioner, complained of the use of hypothetical
questions answered by two doctors who had previously examined him to
determine his competence to stand trial. 79 White was not advised of his
right to remain silent before or after the psychiatric examinations. 80 The
testimony elicited at the punishment phase of the trial clearly indicated
that each doctor had examined the defendant. 8 The facts contained in the
hypothetical questions propounded to each doctor recited exactly the facts
of the defendant's criminal history and, in one of the questions, White's
name was used. The federal district court held that "[a] hypothetical is not
a hypothetical just because it is initiated by the word 'assume' or 'if.' "82
The court concluded that "the jurors were incapable of distinguishing between the hypothetical and the case of petitioner before them,"' 83 because
the doctors' responses to the hypothetical questions could appear to be influenced by pre-trial evaluations. 84 The court maintained that if the jury is
unable to make the distinction between the hypothetical and fact, and the
inability is not fortuitous but a result of the prosecution's deliberate actions, then the accused is compelled against himself in abrogation of the
fifth amendment. 85 The court further held that the use of hypothetical
questions and the admission of the answers before the jury denied the defendant his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel.86 The record
reflected that, at most, the appointed counsel merely advised the defendant
in general terms about possible future psychiatric examinations. The sixth
amendment requirements were not met since there was "no showing that
the kind of well thought-out, individually-tailored counselling session between attorney and petitioner mandated by the Supreme Court and Fifth
78. 554 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
79. Id. at 852-53. Petitioner's conviction had been affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in White v. State, 610 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
80. In contrast to Estelle v. Smith, White's attorneys were notified in advance that the
psychiatric examinations would be conducted. 554 F. Supp. at 853 n.8.
81. The trial court ordered the psychiatric evaluations of White on the state's motion,
even though defense attorneys had not put into issue his competency to stand trial. Id. at
855.
82. Id. at 856.
83. Id.
84. Id. At the evidentiary hearing on the writ, one of the doctors stated that he could
not say that the examination of the defendant had not influenced his testimony.
85. Id
86. Id. at 858. Although the need for sixth amendment protection does not require the
presence of counsel during the psychiatric interview itself, Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d at 708;
United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1976), the Supreme Court has recognized
that a defendant has a right to consult with his attorney before the interview. Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. at 470-71. In Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982), the court
overruled the government's contention that the defendant's sixth amendment rights remained intact because the defendant's attorney may have advised his client in general terms
about possible future psychiatric examination. The Gholson court stated that "[tihe sixth
amendment's protection contemplates more than a casual discussion between attorney and
client regarding the vague possibility that the client may be examined at some indefinite
time in the future for the purpose of aiding in the determination of whether he should be
executed." 675 F.2d at 743 n.9.
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Circuit preceded the examination. '87
The principles enunciated in Smith apparently do not apply to court
ordered presentence interviews. In Trimmer v. State88 the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to a robbery charge and filed a motion for
probation, at which time the court properly admonished her regarding the
effect of her plea. As is customary, the state introduced Trimmer's written
judicial confession in which she waived the appearance, confrontation,
cross-examination of witnesses, and her right against self-incrimination.
The trial court ordered the probation department to conduct a presentence
investigation and file a report, cautioning the defendant that the report
would be used in assessing punishment. At the hearing on punishment,
the only evidence introduced was the presentence report containing both
the police and the defendant's versions of the events pertaining to the
charged offense. 89 The court entered a finding of guilt, and assessed punishment at twelve years confinement. 90 Trimmer contended on appeal that
the use of the presentence report to assess punishment violated her fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was not admonished as to her rights and waiver thereof. Although "[t]he mere finding of guilt does not terminate the privilege against self-incrimination," 9'
Estelle v. Smith, the court held, did not require admonishing a defendant
of his or her fifth amendment rights prior to the defendant's participation
87. 554 F. Supp. at 858. In a dictum, the court expressed serious reservations regarding
the use and validity of psychiatric predictions based on hypotheticals when the doctor has
had no previous contact with the defendant. The court pointed out that the psychiatric
community itself does not generally accept such long-range predictions on future dangerousness. Id.; see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Brief amicus curiae of the American
Psychiatric Ass'n 11-17, White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The White
court also observed that any opinion as to a person's future penchant for violence that does
not follow extensive examination and is not based on a great deal of complex information is
a lay opinion rather than a professional one. The court noted, however, that when such lay
opinions are elicited from a witness who is a doctor, their impact on juries is much greater
than it ought to be. 554 F. Supp. at 858.
88. 651 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, pet. refd).
89. Presentence reports are authorized by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07,
§ 3(d), art. 42.12, § 4 (Vernon 1979 & Vernon Supp. 1984). Id. art. 37.07, § 3(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1984) provides:
When the judge assesses the punishment, he may order an investigative report
as contemplated in section 4 of Article 42.12 of this code and after considering
the report, and after the hearing of the evidence herein above provided for, he
shall forthwith announce his decision in open court as to the punishment to be
assessed.
Id art. 42.12, § 4 (Vernon 1979) provides, in part:
When directed by the court, a probation officer shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing the circumstances of the offense, criminal record,
social history and present condition of the defendant. Whenever practicable,
such investigation shall include a physical and mental examination of the defendant. Defendant, if not represented by counsel, counsel for defendant and
counsel for the state shall be afforded an opportunity to see a copy of the
report upon request.
90. 651 S.W.2d at 905.
91. Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The privilege
against self-incrimination "ceases only when liability to punishment no longer exists." Id.
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in a routine presentence investigation interview. 92 In so holding the court
relied primarily on Baumann v. United States 93 in which the Ninth Circuit
held that "neither Estelle [v. Smith] itself, nor the general principles announced in Miranda, require that a convicted defendant be warned of his
right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting to a rou'94
tine, authorized presentence interview."
The courts continue to be presented frequently with questions involving
the sufficiency of evidence produced by the state to meet its heavy burden
of proof that an accused knowingly and intentionally waived his previously invoked right to counsel under the fifth amendment. 95 The United
States Supreme Court held in Edwards v. Arizona9 6 that once an accused
has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation "a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if
he has been advised of his rights."' 97 The Court further held that an accused, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."' 98 The question of waiver thus turns on whether the state has met its
heavy burden of establishing a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in
each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' "99 In Phifer v. State 0 0 the court of criminal appeals specifically
held that the burden on the state at the suppression hearing is to prove that
the accused initiated the communication with the police in which the inculpatory statement is obtained.' 01 The defendant in Phifer was a poorly
educated twenty-eight-year-old black male with an I.Q. of 69, who was
unable to read or write except to sign his name. He was arrested at his
home for murder and was placed in the Fannin County jail. When representatives from two sheriffs departments arrived at his cell the next day to
interrogate him, Phifer indicated that he wanted an attorney. Phifer's appointed attorney obtained an express agreement with the Fannin County
sheriff that Phifer was not to be questioned by anyone except in the pres92. 651 S.W.2d at 906.
93. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1981).

94. Id. at 576.
95. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (waiver not presumed from defendant's silence after warning); see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369. 372-73
(1979) (quoting Miranda); Stone v. State, 612 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (state
has burden to prove waiver); Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980) (waiver is question of federal constitutional law).
96. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
97. Id. at 484.
98. Id. at 484-85.
99. Id at 482 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
100. 651 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
101. Id at 780.
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ence of defense counsel. Nevertheless, the sheriff initiated a conversation
with Phifer two days later and further interrogation ensued. 10 2 When appointed defense counsel discovered the violation of the agreement, he
complained to the trial court and to the county attorney. The court ordered the sheriff not to permit any more questioning of Phifer without the
presence of counsel. Four days later, a meeting between the sheriff and
Phifer took place, during which Phifer asked to see a particular sheriff's
deputy whom he knew. The record did not reflect who initiated this meeting. Again without informing defense counsel, the sheriff permitted several interrogation sessions to take place, during which Phifer stated that he
no longer wanted his attorney present. The defendant signed a statement
later that day that formed the foundation of the state's case against him.
The court of criminal appeals held that even though Phifer stated that he
wanted to see the officer who eventually took the confession, and even
though he said that he no longer desired to have his lawyer present, the
statement was inadmissible. 0 3 The state maintained the burden of proving at the suppression hearing that the defendant initiated the final meeting at which he gave his statement. The record was silent on whether the
defendant initiated the meeting and, because of this failure to proof, the
court deemed it irrelevant that at some time during the meeting the defendant stated that he did not wish his attorney to be present. The court
reasoned that it would not "fashion a rule that the police may violate a
prisoner's Fifth Amendment right to the presence of counsel as long as
that
they eventually obtain from him during the interrogation a statement
°4
he does not wish counsel to be present while he confesses."
The right to counsel issue was more easily resolved in Coleman v.
State 105 in which the defendant, duly informed of his Miranda rights, was
arrested and taken before a magistrate just shortly after midnight. The
defendant expressly invoked his right to counsel, and the magistrate informed him that "because of the lateness of the hour" he would not be able
to appoint an attorney until "later that morning."' 1 6 The defendant was
immediately taken to the sheriff's office where, after four hours of questioning alone with the sheriff, he confessed to four burglaries, for one of
which he was prosecuted. The court of criminal appeals found that it was
just this type of case that the Supreme Court was concerned with in Edwards v. Arizona, 10 7 and held that the heavy burden placed on the state to
102. A statement by the defendant, however, was not obtained at this time.
103. 651 S.W.2d at 781.
104. Id at 780. The court concluded the following:
[Tihe record as a whole shows that the authorities repeatedly and flagrantly
ignored their agreement with counsel, violated the mentally impaired prisoner's right to counsel, and did their best to conceal the interrogation from
defense counsel and the county attorney, until they broke appellant's will to
resist and obtained a signed statement. If the Fifth Amendment right to counsel serves any purpose, it is to prohibit such police conduct.
Id at 780-81 (footnotes omitted).
105. 646 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
106. Id. at 939.
107. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel was not
met. 10 8 The confession was thus inadmissible, and the conviction was
reversed,
Another recurring issue of critical importance in determining the admissibility of an accused's statement is whether the statement stemmed from
custodial interrogation. 10 9 Whether the defendant was actually in custody
and whether interrogation took place are questions that must be reviewed
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case."10 The United
States Supreme Court has defined custodial interrogation as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.""'1 McCrory v. State"12 is illustrative of the problems inherent in this
deceptively simple formulation and the admissibility determination. In
McCrory a murder suspect was taken to a polygraph examiner by several
enforcement officers prior to his arrest. While the officers observed the
examination behind a one-way mirror, the defendant failed the examination and was then subjected to a post-exam interview by the polygrapher.
The defendant stated, within the hearing of the officers, that he committed
the murder. The officers then arranged for a forensic psychiatrist to go
into the room with the defendant to elicit a full confession from him. After
some questioning by the psychiatrist, the defendant made an oral confession, which was introduced into evidence at the defendant's subsequent
trial. A sharply divided court of criminal appeals held that the defendant
was both in custody and under interrogation at the time the statement was
given.'13 Since no Miranda warnings were ever administered to the defendant, the court reversed the conviction." 4 The majority first reiterated
the four most significant factors that should be considered in determining
whether or not a defendant is in custody: (1) probable cause to arrest, (2)
subjective intent of the police, (3) focus of the investigation, and (4) subjective belief of the defendant. 1 5 Although the police involved testified at
the suppression hearing that they did not formally "arrest" the defendant
until after the statement was given, the totality of the circumstances revealed that neither the officers nor the defendant could have reasonably
108. 646 S.W.2d at 940-41.
109. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that

"[n]o oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding" unless it is electronically recorded with the accused's consent. Id. art. 38.22, § 5 (Vernon 1979) provides, as to
written confessions, that "[n]othing in this article precludes the admission ... of a statement
that does not stem from custodial interrogation . ..."
110. See Ancira v. State, 516 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ("[Wle find it
difficult to formulate a general rule to distinguish custodial interrogation from noncustodial
interrogation. A case-by-case approach in which the evidence is reviewed in the light of
Miranda and subsequent decisions is deemed necessary.")
Ill. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
112. 643 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
113. Id. at 734.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 733. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 565, 578 (1970) (custodial interrogations and Miranda).
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believed that McCrory was free to leave after he admitted the crime to the
polygraph examiner." 16 Moreover, any deficiencies in a determination of
probable cause to believe that the defendant was guilty vanished when he
exclaimed, "I did it; I killed her."'
The officers admitted that the defendant was the focus of the investigation at that time."18 The court held that
the confession was obtained from interrogation even though no showing
was made that the psychiatrist had asked the defendant any questions." 9
The court found an interrogation because the record as a whole clearly
established that the defendant's statement resulted from a calculated practice that the officers present knew was "reasonably likely to evoke an in'7

0
criminating response." 12

An analysis similar to that in McCrory led to the opposite conclusion in
LaPoint v. Stale 12 1 in which a police officer was found to have no probable

cause to arrest at the time the incriminating declaration was made.

22

The

police officer, on duty in the middle of the morning, drove by his own
house and noticed an unfamiliar bicycle parked nearby and the back gate
of his fence open. The officer drew his revolver and walked in to his backyard where he observed a black male standing a few feet away from the
house holding a knife. The police officer asked the man what he was doing
there, and the man responded, "I am burglarizing, sir."' 23 The officer then
placed the defendant under arrest. Subsequent investigation revealed that
a screen was missing from one of the windows next to the back door. The
court of criminal appeals held that it was only after the defendant's incriminating statement that the officer's general suspicion "particularized and
focused on" the defendant. 24 Indeed, the defendant's statement gave the
116. 643 S.W.2d at 734. The majority opined that "it strains credulity to suggest appellant himself thought he could admit commission of this capital murder to [the polygraph
examiner], shake hands around, glance at his watch as he informed the group he was late for
another appointment, and walk out the door!" Id. at 733.
117. Id

118. This case is thus distinguishable from cases involving only a general investigation
into an unsolved crime, such as Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(double murder); Jones v. State, 442 S.W.2d 698, 699-700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (murder);
those involving statements made during a general on-the-scene investigatory stop, such as
Harper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); and those in which the defendant is
affirmatively told that he is not under arrest or is even permitted to leave the company of the
officers to go about his business, see, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977)
(defendant left police interview without hindrance); Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 828-29
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (voluntary appearance at police station).
119. 643 S.W.2d at 734. This lack of questioning was the basis of the dissent, which read
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), as standing for the proposition that there can be
no interrogation without "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers." 643 S.W.2d at
735 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 298).
120. Id. at 734 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301); see also Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394,
396, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214, 218 (1982) (polygraph interrogation). The Supreme Court spoke of
the need for fifth amendment enforcement to combat psychologically oriented interrogation
techniques as early as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467.
121. 650 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
122. Id. at 824.
123. Id at 825.
124. Id at 824.
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officer probable cause to believe a burglary was in progress.125 The subjective intent of the officer was categorized by the court as involving little
more than mere curiosity. The court considered the subjective belief of the
defendant as nothing more than the thought that it would be in his best
interest to tell the truth since he had clearly been caught. 126 All of the facts
and circumstances applied in conjunction with the four significant factors
was not in cusanalysis led the court to the conclusion that the 1defendant
27
tody at the time of his inculpatory declaration.
III.

FORMER JEOPARDY

During the survey period the court of criminal appeals decided that a
defendant may raise and "appeal" a double jeopardy claim before the
commencement of the subsequent trial. In Exparte Robinson 128 Robinson
was discharged in an examining trial for lack of probable cause, but was
indicted later for the same offense. After posting bond, Robinson filed an
application for writ of habeas corpus in the district court, alleging that the
double jeopardy doctrine of collateral estoppel barred his prosecution
under the indictment and that he was, therefore, being unlawfully restrained. In reaching the ultimate issue raised by the accused, the court of
criminal appeals first resolved the procedural issue of "whether the appeljeopardy claim before the trial of the
lant may raise and appeal his 'double
29
indictment which he attacks."'
In 1977 the Supreme Court of the United States held in Abney v. United
States 30 that a pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment in
federal court on double jeopardy grounds was immediately appealable.
The language of Abney is unclear as to whether the decision was grounded
on the construction of the federal jurisdictional statute 13 1 or the constitutional requirements of the fifth amendment. 132 The Court did state, however, that "the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double
Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of
double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence."' 133 The Beaumont court of appeals subsequently held in Spradling
125. Id.at 824-25; see Wussow v. State, 507 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (on-thescene confession).
126. 650 S.W.2d at 825. Curiously, the court in LaPointe apparently holds that being
"caught" by a uniformed officer brandishing a revolver is somehow distinguishable from
being seized or in custody within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The court defines
"in custody" as a circumstance in which "a reasonable person would have believed he was
not free to leave." Id. at 825 n.3 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 545
(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
127. 650 S.W.2d at 825.
128. 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
129. Id. at 554.
130. 431 U.S. 651, 656-62 (1977).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) permits an appeal only from a final decision.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

133. 431 U.S. at 660. The Court noted that it "has long recognized that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against more than being subjected to double punish-
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v. State 34 that Abney did not provide constitutional authority to confer
appellate jurisdiction on a court of appeals to hear an interlocutory appeal
from a state trial court's denial of a plea of former jeopardy. 3 5 The court
noted in a dictum that the holding in Abney was "not grounded upon a
constitutional provision"' 36 and refused to accept the appeal because
38
neither the state constitution 37 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure 39
confer interlocutory appellate jurisdiction on the Texas appellate courts. 1
Any uncertainty about the federal constitutional significance of Abney was
eliminated in UnitedStates v. Hollywood Motor Car Co. 140 The Supreme

Court in that case found that the constitutional right not to be exposed to
double jeopardy was probably the most important of Abney's relevant factors, and that factor would be significantly undermined by postponement
of review until after conviction. The Court then held that freedom from
double jeopardy was a constitutional right that encompasses "a 'right not
to be tried' which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at
all."141

In light of Abney and Hollywood Motor Car, the court of criminal appeals in Robinson was "compelled to hold that there is a Fifth Amendment

right not to be exposed to double jeopardy, and that it must be reviewable
before that exposure occurs."' 42 The court further held that the appellant,
unlike Spradling, had "invoked the proper procedure to challenge one of
the incidents of such exposure," by filing a writ application in the trial
court and by taking an appeal therefrom to the court of criminal appeals.' 4 3 The court in Robinson thus gave Texas defendants the functional
equivalent of an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a plea in
bar based on jeopardy grounds. Today, however, the appeal from the denial of the writ application would be to a court of appeals and not directly
to the court of criminal appeals. 44
Since the Supreme Court decisions in Burks v. United States 45 and
Greene v. Massey 146 that a defendant may not be retried after his convicments. It is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense." Id at 660-61
(emphasis in original).
134. 643 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, no pet.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 971 (1982).
135. 634 S.W.2d at 90-91.
136. Id at 90.
137. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (courts of appeals).
138. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (court of criminal
appeals).
139. 634 S.W.2d at 91.
140. 102 S. Ct. 3081, 3083, 73 L. Ed. 2d 754, 757 (1982).
141. Id at 3084, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 758 (quoting United States v. McDonald, 435 U.S. 850,
860-61 (1978)).
142. 641 S.W.2d at 555.
143. Id.
144. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5 (1891, amended 1978) and the former version of TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.34 (1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 465, § 1, at 1270) gave the court of
criminal appeals jurisdiction over habeas corpus appeals. But see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.34 (Vernon Supp. 1984) that now vests the courts of
appeals with such jurisdiction.
145. 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
146. 437 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1978).
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tion was reversed by an appellate court for insufficiency of the evidence,
appellate courts have been required to assess the sufficiency of the evidence even if a conviction is reversed on other grounds. 147 The question
persisted, however, as to whether an accused's jeopardy protections were
offended by a retrial if the first prosecution was based upon a fundamentally defective indictment or information. Prior to Burks and Greene, original proceedings were void and the prior conviction resulting therefrom
did not bar a retrial for the same offense, 148 since a fundamentally defective pleading does not vest the trial court with jurisdiction.149 Whenever a
person in Texas was validly convicted and appealed his case to the court of
criminal appeals, and that court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the conviction, the maximum relief an appellant could receive on
appeal was reversal and remand to the trial court for a new trial. 50
In Foster v. State' 5' the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine on a fundamentally defective indictment. 152 On original submission,
a panel of the court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction, but refused to enter an order of acquittal under Burks and Greene because the
trial court did not have jurisdiction of the particular offense and, therefore,
jeopardy could not have attached.' 53 The court, therefore, refused to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. 154 On motion for rehearing the court
held that even if the pleading on which the prosecution is based is fundamentally defective, article I, section 14 of the Texas Constitution bars re155
trial upon a finding of insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
The court explained that jeopardy and trial are different matters, and reasoned that even if it were possible that a fundamentally defective indictment did not place one in jeopardy under the first clause of article I,
147. See, e.g., Froyd v. State, 633 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Hooker v.

State, 621 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877, 880
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
148. Andrews v. State, 436 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Whitehead v. State,
162 Tex. Crim. 507, 508, 286 S.W.2d 947, 948 (1956).
149. Daniels v. State, 573 S.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Standley v. State,
517 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
150. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
have long held, however, that a verdict of acquittal is a bar to retrial for the acquitted offense, even if the indictment charging the offense was fundamentally defective. See Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 30 (1978) (statute repealed before indictment); Finch v. United States,
433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977) (failure to state an offense); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 25
(1977) (lack of allegation of necessary element); Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 459
(1973) (lack of allegation of necessary element); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 664
(1896) (no legal indictment); Mixon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 458, 34 S.W. 290 (1896) (original
indictment faulty).
151. 635 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
152. At the time of the indictment, which described the substance as merely "cocaine,"
that substance was not specifically named in the penalty group of the Controlled Substances
Act. Such pleadings, therefore, failed to allege an offense and were fundamentally defective.
Crowl v. State, 611 S.W.2d 59, 60-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
153. 635 S.W.2d at 711.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 714. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14 provides that "[n]o person, for the same offense,
shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for
the same offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction."
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section 14, the second clause bars retrial as long as an appropriate court
entered a verdict of not guilty.' 56 Specifically, a finding of insufficient evidence on appeal is equivalent to a verdict of not guilty and prevents retrial
for the same offense charged. 57 The court concluded by holding that
"though the judgment of conviction must be reversed because of a fatally
defective indictment, [the appellate court] will examine and decide the
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the
contention that
15 8

judgment."'

Jeopardy problems frequently arise when a trial court declares a mistrial
after jeopardy has attached.' 59 To permit retrial, a termination of a criminal trial after jeopardy attaches can only be proper when required by
"manifest necessity" or the "ends of public justice."' 160 In Schaffer v.
State16 1 the court of criminal appeals emphasized that trial judges and
prosecutors must ensure that the record clearly reflects that the jeopardy
requirements are met, preferably by explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law, in order to save the case for retrial. After a jury had been
impaneled and sworn at Schaffer's trial, one of the jurors informed the
court that he felt he was disqualified because of his discussion about the
case with another person and the possibility that he had formed an opinion
about the case. The record did not reflect any further examination to determine whether the juror was absolutely disqualified under article 35.16
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.162 The trial court sua sponte declared
a mistrial without the consent of the defendant. The case was set for trial,
156. 635 S.W.2d at 714-15.
157. The court's interpretation of the second clause of § 14 of the Texas Bill of Rights
was adopted almost a century ago in Anderson v. State, 24 Tex. App. 705, 7 S.W. 40 (1886).

158. 635 S.W.2d at 717. The court went on to find the evidence insufficient to sustain the
appellant's conviction for cocaine possession, and accordingly ruled that the defendant
could not be prosecuted further. Id at 720.
159. Jeopardy attaches after the jury has been selected and sworn. See Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S. 28, 37 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973); McElwee v. State, 489
S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
160. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458, 469 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d
436, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Chvojka v. State, 582 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979). In Somerville the Court wrote:
A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached
but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in
the trial. If an error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, it would not
serve "the ends of public justice" to require that the Government proceed with
its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be
stripped of that success by an appellate court.
410 U.S. at 464.
161. 649 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
162. Id at 639 n.4. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1966-1983) sets out the eleven permissible categories for challenges for cause by either side,
only three of which constitute absolute disqualification: that the juror is insane, has been
convicted, or is under indictment for theft or any felony. The fact that the juror in Shaffer
formed a conclusion about the case that could influence his verdict would have provided a
basis for excusal for cause under art. 35.16(a)(10), but this ground is not an absolute disqualification and can be waived. The trial court should not excuse prospective jurors on its own
motion unless the jurors are absolutely disqualified. Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516, 524
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the defendant's former jeopardy plea overruled, and the defendant convicted. The court of criminal appeals reversed and entered an order of
acquittal on the grounds that the record did not demonstrate any manifest
necessity or show that the end of public justice would have been defeated
if the mistrial had not been granted. 163 The court observed that the trial
court failed to enter findings or offer any explanation in the record as to
the reasons for the mistrial decision. 164 Because of these record
deficien165
cies the plea of former jeopardy should have been granted.
Finally, in Garza v. State 166 the court of criminal appeals held that the
state's abandonment of one or more counts in a multicount indictment
constitutes a jeopardy bar to further prosecution of the abandoned charges
even when no adjudication of guilt on the remaining counts exist.167 The
defendant in Garza was charged originally with aggravated assault and
felony riot in a two-count indictment. At the close of the evidence in the
first trial, the state abandoned the riot count and elected to proceed to the
jury on the aggravated assault charge. The trial resulted in a hung jury
and declaration of a mistrial. At the second trial on the same indictment,
the state elected to proceed on the riot count, on which the defendant was
convicted. The court of criminal appeals en banc decided that the former
jeopardy provisions of both the federal and state constitutions barred the
retrial on the riot count that was abandoned before the mistrial on the
assault count.' 68 The court reasoned that the state's decision to abandon a
count is in itself tantamount to the declaration of a mistrial without manifest necessity.169 The fact that the remaining count did not result in a con170
viction or acquittal was deemed irrelevant.
IV.

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

The court of criminal appeals confirmed in Cole v. State 171 that the government cannot circumvent the Speedy Trial Act 172 by filing a new indictment or information in a case if the applicable time limit has run on the
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Valore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980).
163. 649 S.W.2d at 639-40.
164. Id at 639. In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 (1978), the Supreme Court
advised that the review of any trial court decision is facilitated by findings and by an explanation supporting the decision granting the mistrial.
165. 649 S.W.2d at 639-40.
166. 658 S.W.2d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
167. The court explained that its holding was merely an application of the long-established general rule that failure to submit a count is tantamount to a dismissal thereof, and if
jeopardy has attached, the defendant cannot on a subsequent trial be prosecuted on the
abandoned count. Id at 158; see Scelles v. State, 511 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Parish v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 117, 120, 165 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1942); Deisher v. State,
89 Tex. Crim. 467, 469, 233 S.W. 978, 979 (1921); Mizell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 305, 306, 203
S.W. 49, 51 (1918).
168. 658 S.W.2d at 159; see U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14.
169. 658 S.W.2d at 155-56.
170. Id. at 159.
171. 650 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
172. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983).
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original charging instrument. The prosecution in Cole dismissed the information against the defendant as to which the time period had already expired and filed another information containing identical allegations on the
same date under a new cause number. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the information under the Speedy Trial Act. The
state maintained that the trial court properly overruled the defendant's
motion because the defendant failed to prove that the dismissal of the first
cause and the commencement of the second cause were initiated to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act. The court of criminal appeals concluded that
the motive for changing cause numbers is immaterial in determining compliance with the Act. 173 Section 4(7) of the Act provides that any time
between the dismissal of a previous charge and the commencement of subsequent charge arising out of the same transaction is excluded in computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial. 174 The court,
therefore, held that the time that elapsed under the first charging instrument had to be included in computing the time limits applicable to the
75
subsequent charging instrument. 1
The court also recently held in Durrough v. State 176 that a defendant
should not be permitted to include in this computation any time that expired during periods of continuance that he requested while the previous
charge was pending. 177 In Durrough the state obtained a new indictment
charging the defendant with the same offense without previously dismissing the original indictment. Because of several continuances and
speedy trial waivers filed by the defendant under the original indictment,
less than 120 days of nonexcludable time had elapsed. The reindictment,
however, was not filed until after 120 days from the commencement of the
action. The defendant claimed that his speedy trial waivers in the original
cause were not applicable to the reindictment. The court found that section 4(7) implies a continuing relationship between the time periods covered by the previous indictment and the subsequent one. The court thus
held that the periods of delay resulting from continuances and resultant
speedy trial waivers in the previous cause, granted at the request of the
defendant, were properly excluded from the computation of time in the
subsequent cause, and that the trial court had correctly "transferred" the
78
waivers. 1
173. 650 S.W.2d at 820.
174. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4(7) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983),

provides that in computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, the following
shall be excluded:

[I]f the charge is dismissed upon motion of the state or the charge is disposed
of by a final judgment and the defendant is later charged with the same offense or another offense arising out of the same transaction, the period of delay from the date of dismissal or the date of the final judgment to the date the

time limitation would commence running on the subsequent charge had there
175.
176.
177.
178.

been no previous charge . . ..
650 S.W.2d at 820.
620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139-40.
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The time that elapses under a previous cause now clearly counts against
the state in computing the time periods applicable under a subsequent
charging instrument, at least if the charges under both are identical. Likewise, periods of time that can be excluded by the state because of continuances 179 or other waivers by the defendant under the previous cause can be
excluded by the state in determining the time by which the state must be
ready in a subsequent cause. The court has not, however, adequately addressed those issues where the prior and subsequent charging instruments
allege different offenses or otherwise include materially different legal or
factual allegations.
The court of criminal appeals also had occasion during the survey period to define further what constitutes prosecutorial delay under the Act.
In Lyles v. State 80 the court held that unnecessary delay by law enforcement officials in obtaining the defendant's presence is not an "exceptional
circumstance" excludable by the state if the exercise of due diligence by
the prosecuting authority could have secured the presence of the defendant
for trial.' 8 ' In Lyles the defendant's presence was not secured until 228
days after the commencement of the case due to an inexplicable rejection
of the bail bond posted by the defendant in another county. As a result,
the defendant was carried in a nonarrest status and his case was never set
for trial. The state made no showing that the defendant was attempting to
avoid prosecution or that the state was unaware of his location. When the
prosecutor became aware of the situation, he obtained a setting for the case
and issued a summons for the defendant's appearance. Because the prosecutor could easily have taken these steps prior to the expiration of the Act's
time limits, the court of criminal appeals found that the state had failed to
exercise due diligence in obtaining the defendant's presence.' 82 Although
the court has consistently held that the Speedy Trial Act refers to the
preparedness of the prosecutor for trial and does not encompass the judicial process as a whole, 83 "[tlhe prosecutor cannot excuse a lack of due
diligence on his part by pointing the finger at the Sheriff or other law enforcement agency."' 84 In so holding, the court reiterated the principle set
down in Newton v. State 85 that "the defendant's presence is a readiness
burden which falls upon the State." 186 The fact that the speedy trial tolling
179. Periods of delay resulting from continuances granted at the request, or with the

consent, of the defendant are generally excluded from computation of the applicable time
limitation under the Act pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4(3)
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983).
180. 653 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
181. Id. at 779; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4(10) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1966-1983).
182. 653 S.W.2d at 779.
183. See Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Ordunez v. Bean,
579 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also McMahon v. State, 630 S.W.2d 730,
736 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. ref'd) (standard for dismissal depends on
prosecutor's not trial court's readiness).
184. 653 S.W.2d at 779.
185. 641 S.W.2d 530, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
186. 653 S.W.2d at 778.

1984]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

exceptions contained in section 4 of the Act include three instances in
which the state will not be charged with delays due to the defendant's absence clearly justifies the court's interpretation. 187 In situations, therefore,
where a case is not docketed because of delays resulting from disapproval
of a bond or other similar circumstances, the state will carry a very heavy
burden at a subsequent speedy trial hearing to prove that the defendant's
presence could not have been obtained had the prosecution exercised due
88
diligence. 1
Other aspects of the Speedy Trial Act continue to provide a fertile
source of litigation as the courts wrestle with such evasive terms as "ready
for trial"189 and "exceptional circumstances." 190 Of utmost significance to
the practitioner is the court of criminal appeals' holding in Martin t.
State' 9' that a plea of guilty does not constitute a waiver of the rights
afforded under the Act. 19 2 A panel opinion of the court in Ramirez v.
State 193 inexplicably held in 1979 that rights under the Speedy Trial Act
are waived by virtue of a guilty plea.' 94 The Ramirez court cited the language of section 3, which merely provides that these rights are waived if a
defendant fails to file a speedy trial motion prior to trial or to entering a

guilty plea. 195 The subsequent decisions in Luna v. State 196 and Flores v.
State 197 reached the same result, citing Ramirez without discussion. This
implausible conclusion drew vigorous dissent and sharply divided the
court, with four members complaining that the fundamental precepts of
187. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4(4), (5) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 19661983) provides that the state may exclude:
(4) a period of delay resulting from the absence of the defendant because
his location is unknown and:
(A) he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution; or
(B) the state has been unable to determine his location by due diligence;
(5) a period of delay resulting from the unavailability of the defendant
whose location is known to the state but whose presence cannot be obtained
by due diligence or because he resists being returned to the state for trial ....
188. The court in Lyles expressly overruled the opinion of the Dallas court of appeals in
McPeters v. State, 624 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, no pet.), in which the trial delay
was due to a mistake in the sheriffs office in processing the bond made by McPeters. 653
S.W.2d at 778-79. The Dallas court of appeals held that such a delay constituted an exceptional circumstance that justified tolling the time period under the Speedy Trial Act. 624
S.W.2d at 377.
189. A speedy trial motion must be granted and the prosecution dismissed if the state is
not ready for trial within specified time periods after commencement of the case. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § I (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983).
190. This blanket tolling provision, found at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02,
§ 4(10) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983), allows the state to exclude "any other reasonable
period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances."
191. 652 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
192. Id. at 779.
193. 590 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
194. Id. at 510.
195. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983) provides that "[t]he failure of a defendant to move for discharge under the provisions of this
article prior to trial or the entry of a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of the rights accorded
by this article."
196. 602 S.W.2d 267, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
197. 606 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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English grammar and the legislative history of the Act clearly mandated
the opposite result.' 98 Nevertheless, the Ramirez interpretation prevailed
for several years until an almost unanimous court finally decided in Martin that "such rights claimed by an accused under the Act are not lost by a
subsequent plea of guilty."' 199
V.

VENUE

No dramatic developments in the established law on venue materialized
during the survey period, although several instructive opinions were
200
handed down regarding procedural requisites and sufficiency of proof.
In Black v. State20 ' the only evidence bearing on venue was the testimony
of two investigating police officers who testified that as employees of the
Tyler police department and while on duty on a specified block and street,
they arrested the defendant for possession of marijuana. Neither the city
nor the county where the offense was committed, however, was expressly
placed into evidence. The information alleged that the offense occurred in
Smith County. 20 2 After the state rested, the defendant made a timely motion for acquittal premised upon the state's failure to prove venue that was
overruled by the trial court. 20 3 Despite the fact that in criminal cases
venue need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 2°4 and may
be demonstrated by either direct or circumstantial evidence, 20 5 the court of
criminal appeals reversed, finding no evidence to connect the county of the
offense to the county alleged in the indictment. 20 6 The court considered
mere reference to the name of the police department with whom the officers were employed and to the name of the street where the offense took
place wholly insufficient to satisfy the state's burden of proof.20 7 The dissent considered the evidence sufficient for the fact finder reasonably to
198. 602 S.W.2d at 267-68 (Clinton, J., dissenting); 606 S.W.2d at 860-61 (Phillips, J.,&

Clinton, J., dissenting).
199. 652 S.W.2d at 779. Martin was a 7-1-1 decision. The doctrine of stare decisis
notwithstanding, this is actually the second time the court has switched positions on this
issue. Six months prior to Ramirez the court of criminal appeals ruled in Riggall v. State,

590 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc), that the defendant's "guilty plea did not
waive his pretrial motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial." Id. at 462 (on motion for
rehearing). Riggall was ignored by the majority in Flores, Luna, and the panel opinion in
Ramirez, but was urged as controlling authority by the dissent in Flores. 606 S.W.2d at 860
(Clinton, J., dissenting).
200. The statutory rules on venue in Texas criminal cases are codified in ch. 13 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.

201. 645 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
202. All informations must set forth the county or district in which the offense is charged
to have been committed so that the case is within the jurisdiction of the court where the
information is filed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.21(5) (Vernon 1966). This rule
likewise applies to indictments. Id art. 21.02(5).

203. 645 S.W.2d at 790. The defense made no motion for instructed verdict because
Black was tried before a judge, not a jury.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Banks v. State, 530 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
See Haynes v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 52, 55, 143 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1940).
645 S.W.2d at 791.
Id
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conclude that the offense was committed in Smith County as alleged. 20 8 It
relied on prior case authority that allowed courts to take judicial notice
20 9
that a certain city or town is within a particular county.
The court's opinion in Black fortuitously points to other venue issues of
critical procedural importance. Article 44.24(a) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that venue shall be presumed on appeal unless made
"an issue in the court below. '2 10 The court held in Black, however, that
the mere entry of the defendant's plea of not guilty automatically put "in
issue" the allegations of venue, so that the state must prove the allegations
for the conviction to stand. 2 l The court reiterated the corollary principle
that the defendant need not put venue in issue either by special plea or by
introducing evidence to negate the allegation. 21 2 Confusion understandably results, however, from the many cases holding that under article
44.24(a) the venue issue is waived for purposes of appellate review because
no issue of venue was made in the trial court, even though it was put "in
issue" by the defendant's plea of not guilty. 2 13 The distinction appears to
lie in the difference in meaning between making an issue of venue and
placing venue in issue at trial. The entry of a not guilty plea accomplishes
the latter, and merely requires the state to prove venue by a preponderance
of the evidence. On the other hand, venue is "made" an issue, and is
thereby preserved for appeal, by a motion for instructed verdict of acquittal for failure to prove venue, or by evidence negating the venue allega208. 645 S.W.2d at 793 (Onion, J., dissenting). The court had previously held that evidence on venue was sufficient if the jury could reasonably conclude that the offense was
committed in the county alleged in the indictment or information. See Edwards v. State,
427 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Rippee v. State, 384 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1964); Curtis v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 536, 538, 321 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1959).
209. 645 S.W.2d at 793. For example, in Moore v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 542, 544, 209
S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948), judicial notice of the fact that Lubbock is the
county seat of Lubbock County was permitted. Similarly, in Monford v. State, 35 Tex.
Crim. 237,239, 33 S.W. 351, 351 (1896), the court held that judicial notice could be taken of
the fact that the city of Galveston is in Galveston County. See generally R. RAY, TEXAS
PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 193 (1980) (location of cities and towns). Some civil case
authority arguably goes even further, permitting courts to take judicial notice that a particular street address within its jurisdiction is located in a certain county. See, e.g., Harper v.
Killion, 162 Tex. 481, 485, 348 S.W.2d 521, 523 (1961) (city of Jacksonville in Cherokee
County); LaSora v. Burr, 516 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974,
no writ) (intersection of highways); Evans Associated Indus., Inc. v. Evans, 493 S.W.2d 547.
548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (street address).
210. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides in part
that "[tlhe courts of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals shall presume that the venue
was proved in the court below . . .unless such matters were made an issue in the court
below, or it otherwise affirmatively appears to the contrary from the record."
211. 645 S.W.2d at 790; accord Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981); Shelton v. State, 27 Tex. App. 443, 444, 11 S.W. 457, 458 (1889); Tucker v. State, 25
Tex. App. 653, 653-54, 8 S.W. 813, 813 (1888); West v. State, 21 Tex. App. 427, 428, 2 S.W.
810, 811 (1886).
212. 645 S.W.2d at 790.
213. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 558 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Grant v.
State, 507 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Vasquez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 173, 175
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McCoy v. State, 478 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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tions. 2 14 The defendant in Black obtained appellate review by meeting
both requirements: he pled not guilty and he moved for judgment of acquittal after the state had rested. Failure to have made such a motion
would have resulted in waiver of the issue on appeal by permitting the
appellate court to presume that venue was2 15proven pursuant to article
44.24(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The court's ultimate disposition of Black raises an intriguing question
that the court totally failed to address. Since the state failed to prove
venue, the court concluded that the trial court improperly denied the appellant's motion for acquittal. The court, however, did not reverse and
dismiss, but merely reversed and remanded. 2 16 Because a finding of insufficient evidence on appeal, like an acquittal in the trial court, now precludes retrial on double jeopardy grounds, 21 7 and since the court of
criminal appeals routinely enters orders of acquittal or directs the trial
court to do so in such cases, the Black court's manner of disposition is
difficult to reconcile or justify. Whether venue, limitations, and other such
issues that are a part of the state's proof, though not strictly considered
elements of the offense, should subject a case to a Burks/Greene analysis is
a significant question that the court of criminal appeals has yet expressly to
resolve.

21 8

In another case the court further illuminated the rule that failure to file a
motion for change of venue by the date set for the pretrial hearing does not
waive the motion, despite the requirement to that effect contained in article
28.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 21 9 In Revia v. State220 a pretrial
hearing was held two months prior to trial. Just before the commencement
of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, the defendant presented his
motion for a change of venue for the first time. The trial court denied this
motion on the ground that it was untimely filed. 2 2' The state never controverted the motion, and no hearing was held thereon. On appeal the court
reversed the conviction, holding that the limitations of article 28.01 could
no longer bar consideration of a motion for change of venue in light of
several Supreme Court decisions giving venue questions constitutional di214. See Martin v. State, 385 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). In bench trials, a

motion for judgment of acquittal is the proper motion.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
645 S.W.2d at 791.
See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
See Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (circumstantial

evidence of venue held sufficient).
219. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01, § I (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983) provides that "[t]he court may set any criminal case for a pre-trial hearing ....
[which] shall
be to determine any of the following matters: . . . (7) Motions for change of venue by the
State or the defendant ....
" Section 2 provides that matters not filed or raised by the
pretrial hearing will generally be waived: "When a criminal case is set for such pre-trial
hearing, any such preliminary matters not raised or filed seven days before the hearing will

not thereafter be allowed to be raised or filed, except by permission of the court for good
cause shown ....
" Id. § 2.
220. 649 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
221. Id. at 626.
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mension. 222 The court did not expressly hold the applicable portions of
article 28.01 unconstitutional insofar as they bar venue motions subsequent to pretrial hearings, but did hold that these statutory provisions are
to be disregarded in determining whether a motion for change of venue is
223
properly filed.

VI.

JURY SELECTION

The court of criminal appeals continues routinely to reverse death penalty cases when prospective jurors are excluded in violation of the proscriptions laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v.
Illinois224 and Adams v. Texas. 225 Witherspoon held that a prospective juror may not be excluded by the trial court for cause unless the juror clearly
indicates that (1) he would automatically vote against the imposition of the
death penalty without regard to any evidence that might be introduced at
the trial of the case, or (2) his attitude toward capital punishment would
prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt. 226 A death sentence, consequently, cannot stand if the jury was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause "simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious
scruples against its infliction. '227 In Adams the Court held that section
12.3 1(b) of the Texas Penal Code,2 2 8 which disqualifies a prospective juror
unless he can state that the death penalty will not "affect" his deliberations, was violative of the sixth and fourteenth amendments if used to
exclude jurors on grounds broader than those established by Witherspoon
and its progeny. 229 The Adams court explained that "to exclude all jurors
222. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
Repia was soon relied on in Biegajski v. State, 653 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, pet. refd), to reach the same result.
223. 649 S.W.3d at 626. Courts should, therefore, look primarily to TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 31.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983) (defendant's motion for change of
venue). See Biegajski v. State, 653 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, pet.

refd); Hussey v. State, 590 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); McManus v. State, 591
S.W.2d 505, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Stapleton v. State, 565 S.W.2d 532, 533-34 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978); Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); see also
Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (refusal of hearing on controverted motion for change of venue held deprivation of due process).
224. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
225. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
226. 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
227. Id.at 522.
228. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974) provides:

Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or
death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall
be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the
mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
229. 448 U.S. at 50-51; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-97 (1978) (exclusion of
jurors not violative of Witherspoon); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 481-84 (1969) (jury
not selected in accordance with Wiherspoon). The Adams decision overturned sub silentio
several Texas cases holding that section 12.3 l(b) could be used to exclude prospective jurors,
independently of Witherspoon. See, e.g., Huges v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979) ("[W]hen a juror is disqualified under Sec.
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who would be in the slightest way affected by the prospect of the death
penalty or by their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the
defendant of the impartial jury to which he or she is entitled under the
law."' 230 Thus, if any veniremen aver that they will consider and decide
the facts impartially and will conscientiously apply the law as charged by
the court, they may not be excluded for cause merely because they frankly
concede that the potentially lethal consequences of their decision would
"invest their deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or would
23
involve them emotionally." '
In Hartfield v. State232 the court of criminal appeals translated the
Witherspoon/Adams rules by stating their converse: a juror may be properly excluded when, but only when, "he is not willing to accept that death
may be a punishment in certain circumstances or. . . he is not willing and
able to answer the statutory questions impartially, without conscious distortion or bias."'233 The trial court in Haro/eld excluded a venirewoman
under section 12.31 (b) because of her voir dire admission that her deliberations might be affected by her knowledge of the possible penalty. On appeal the case was reversed because she had further stated that she could
vote "yes" to the special issues if the evidence revealed "a real bad murder."' 234 The venirewoman had thus indicated that she would base her
verdict on the evidence, as required, even though the potential penalty
would affect her deliberations. The same result was reached in Graham v.
State235 in which the prospective juror admitted that his deliberations
would be affected, but also testified that he thought capital punishment
was justified under certain conditions, and that he "probably could" vote
to impose the death penalty in a proper case. The court held that the juror's mere conscientious reservations against capital punishment were an
insufficient basis for exclusion. 236 In Cuevas v. State237 the excluded
venireman told the trial court that he had conscientious scruples against
the death penalty and that under no circumstances could he participate as
a juror in returning a verdict that would require the court to assess the
death penalty. Upon subsequent questioning by defense counsel, however,
the prospective juror stated that he could follow the law and base his deci12.31(b), supra, we do not need to consider his qualifications under Witherspoon."); Free-

man v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978)

(juror disqualified solely on the basis of § 12.31(b)); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672
(Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1976) (Witherspoon not considered because
jurors were disqualified under § 12.3 1(b)).
230. 448 U.S. at 50.
231. Id. at 49-50. Although the jury in Texas does not directly vote on whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment, affirmative answers to the special issues submitted under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981) require the trial court
to assess punishment at death.
232. 645 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (opinion on original submission).
233. Id. at 438.
234. Id. at 440.
235. 643 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (on original submission).
236. Id.at 923-24.
237. 641 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
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sion on the evidence, despite his feeling that the potential death penalty
would affect his deliberations. This latter testimony required the reversal
of the conviction. 238 Rehabilitation by defense counsel was similarly successful in Mead v. State.239 The excluded venireman in Mead initially
appeared disqualified. Upon further questioning, however, he claimed he
could "truthfully" answer the special issues and base his answers on the
evidence.
In Hernandez v. State240 the court of criminal appeals confronted the
troublesome problem of the "equivocating venireman" whose ambiguous
and noncommittal answers during voir dire do not readily lend themselves
to application of the Witherspoon analysis. Several prospective jurors in
Hernandez would go no further than to state that they "didn't think" they
could vote to assess the death penalty. Their exclusion was upheld on appeal because Witherspoon does not require specific formalized answers and
because the trial judge can best determine whether a particular venireman
is in fact unequivocally committed to vote against imposition of the death
penalty. 24' The court of criminal appeals ruled that if the prospective juror equivocates and serious doubt is cast on his ability to be a fair and
impartial juror, the trial court's decision to excuse the juror for cause will
be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. 242
In noncapital cases several appellate decisions issued during the survey
period dealt with limitations on the length and scope of voir dire. In Whitaker v. State24 3 the trial court placed a fifty-minute time limit on the defendant's voir dire examination. Out of thirty-two members of the jury
panel, defense counsel was unable to complete his questioning beyond the
twenty-fifth panel member. The Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed,
holding that while the trial court may impose reasonable restrictions on
voir dire, including reasonable time limitations, 244 the judge in the instant
case had allowed only an average of two minutes per prospective juror.
The court of appeals, therefore, concluded that the time limitation was
unreasonable. 245 The court noted that defense counsel made no attempt to
prolong the voir dire, and that all questions asked and tendered were pertinent. 246 The court of criminal appeals, however, reached the opposite conclusion. A plurality ruled that the trial court's limitation did not reflect an
abuse of discretion because the defense was provided with completed juror
information forms twenty-five minutes prior to voir dire, which gave coun238. Id at 563.

239. 645 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
240. 643 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
241. Id. at 406.
242. Id. For other cases dealing with equivocating jurors, see Villarreal v. State, 576
S.W.2d 51, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
243. 653 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
244. See Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
245. Whitaker v. State, 654 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, pet. granted).
246. Id.
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sel a "head start" in obtaining information. 247 The court also held that no
harm was shown since the record did not reflect whether the jury was comvenireman that defense counsel had not examined
posed of any
248
individually.
A restriction on the scope of voir dire necessitated reversal in Gonzales v.
State 249 in which the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to ask
whether any of the prospective jurors had ever served on a grand jury.
The court of appeals noted that the permissible areas of panel questioning
are broad, in order to permit counsel to utilize peremptory challenges effectively. The court then reiterated the general principle that denial of a
proper question is always harmful error. 250 Because the court considered a
grand jury service proper, the trial court's requestion concerning prior
25
fusal required reversal. '
VII.

COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL

In Williams v.State2 - 2 the court of criminal appeals declared that the
standard for determining whether to hold a competency hearing during a
trial is the same as that used when the issue is raised prior to trial.253 Article 46.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 254 requires a trial court, generally on motion of defense counsel, to conduct a competency hearing
before a jury in advance of trial "if the court determines there is evidence
to support a finding of incompetency. ' 255 A mere showing of "some evidence, more than none or a scintilla," is sufficient to force the trial judge to
empanel a jury for a separate hearing on competency prior to the trial on
the merits. 256 When the issue is raised during the trial, however, article
46.02 provides for a special section 2(b) inquiry hearing by the judge for
the purpose of deciding whether or not a full-fledged competency hearing
must be held before another jury panel. 257 The court of criminal appeals
247. 653 S.W.2d at 782.
248. Id. at 781; cf. De La Rosa v. State, 414 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967)

(conviction reversed on ground that trial court's 30-minute voir dire limitation was unreasonable because it did not permit defense counsel to question individually all members of

panel); Barrett v. State, 516 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (30-minute restriction
on voir dire upheld, since defense counsel spent over 20 minutes explaining law to jury
panel and tendered 26 pages of proposed individual questions to court, many of which were
deemed impertinent).
249. 638 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no pet.).
250. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 836-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
251. 638 S.W.2d at 133; see Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
252. No. 098-83 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 1984).
253. Id.,slip. op. at 3-4.
254. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02 (Vernon 1979).
255. Id. § 2(a). Generally, criminal prosecutions cannot proceed if the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, in that he does not have "sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [or he lacks] a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. § l(a)(l)-(2).
256. Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
257. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b) (Vernon 1979) provides:
If during the trial evidence of the defendant's incompetency is brought to the
attention of the court from any source, the court must conduct a hearing out of
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previously construed this provision to require a much greater and uncontradicted evidentiary showing of incompetency before the inquiry hearing
was mandated. In Johnson v. State258 for example, the court fashioned the
rule that a trial court need not even hold an inquiry hearing under section
2(b) when the competency issue is raised during trial unless, from all of the
evidence, a "bona fide doubt" exists in the judge's mind as to whether the
defendant is competent to stand trial. 25 9 The court's apprehension of the
prospect of baseless incompetency claims interrupting a trial on the merits
and unnecessarily halting the proceedings to determine competency separately apparently motivated this interpretation. 260
In overturning Johnson and its progeny 26' the Williams court observed
that article 46.02 does not require an immediate halting of the trial on the
merits whenever the issue is raised. Rather, the section 2(b) inquiry hearing may be conducted after the close of evidence and the separate competency hearing may be held at any time prior to sentencing. 262 Because the
statutory language regarding the evidentiary showing needed to trigger a
midtrial incompetency hearing is identical to that used concerning pretrial
incompetency, 263 the court found that little basis existed for imposition of
264
the stricter bona fide doubt standard for midtrial determinations.
Therefore, whenever any evidence, from any source, comes to the attention of the trial court during trial that tends to show, and thus adequately
raises, the issue of incompetency, the trial court must conduct a section
2(b) inquiry hearing. The trial court must determine whether some evidence, a quantity more than none or a scintilla, is shown that rationally
may lead to a conclusion of incompetency, by considering only "that evidence tending to show incompetency" and "putting aside all competing
indications of competency. ' 265 If some evidence exists under this standard,
a competency hearing before a separate jury must be held sometime prior
266
to sentencing.
the presence of the jury to determine whether or not there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial.
258. 564 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (on motion for rehearing).
259. Id. at 710-11.

260. Id. at 710. The bona fide doubt standard was adopted by the court prior to the
legislature's enactment of § 2(b) in 1975, and apparently was derived from dictum gleaned
from Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). See Exparte Halford, 536 S.W.2d 230, 231
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Wilborn v. State, 491 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);
Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 59-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
261. See Hawkins v. State, 628 S.W.2d 71, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Mata v. State, 632
S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Thompson v. State, 612 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981); Garcia v. State, 595 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Burch v.
State, 654 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no pet.); Williams v. State, 653
S.W.2d 574, 579-80 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, pet. refd).
262. No. 098-83, slip op. at 3.
263. Both sections mandate a competency hearing if the court determines "there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 46.02, § 2(a), (b) (Vernon 1979).
264. No. 098-83, slip op. at 2, 4.
265. Id. at 2; see Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
266. No. 098-83, slip op. at 3-4. All competency hearings must be conducted before a
jury different from that selected to hear the trial on the merits. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
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The trial court's failure or refusal to hold a section 2(b) inquiry hearing,
however, will not necessarily constitute reversible error. The court has
consistently evaded any resolution of the difficult yet crucial distinction
between the standard of proof necessary to trigger the midtrial inquiry
hearing and the standard that compels the trial court to hold an actual
competency hearing. 267 The Williams opinion implicitly suggests that
both standards are the same, but neglects to state expressly how the issue
can be "raised" in the first place during trial. A trial court's refusal to
conduct an inquiry hearing presumably could be revealed as erroneous
only if "some evidence" were in the record by proffer, bill of exception, or
otherwise, showing that the provisions of section 2(b) were implicated.
Perhaps, however, a mere motion or request for a competency hearing is
sufficient to raise the issue.
The whole purpose of an inquiry hearing, however, is to determine
whether "some evidence" exists. If only well-grounded claims require an
inquiry hearing, then a competency hearing necessarily would follow, rendering the inquiry a meaningless and useless formality. 26 8 Thus, despite
the apparent evidentiary prerequisite contained in the statutory language
of section 2(b), a midtrial motion for a competency hearing logically would
suffice to obligate the trial court to conduct the inquiry hearing.2 69 One
can only speculate, however, as to the nature and quantity of proof that
might suffice in the absence of an affirmative request.
VIII.

SELF-INCRIMINATION AND IMMUNITY

In another demonstration of judicial accession to minimum federal standards of protection, the court of criminal appeals held in Ex parte
Shorthouse 270 that the Texas constitutional privilege against self-incrimination 27' will henceforth be construed as providing no broader degree of
protection than that of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. 272 This pronouncement afforded the court in Shorthouse with its singular justification for overruling an extensive body of case law and for
ANN. art. 46.02, § 4(a), (f) (Vernon 1979) (incompetency hearing). Id. § 4(c) expressly provides that a competency issue raised during trial may be heard at any time prior to
sentencing.
267. See Williams, No. 098-83, slip op. at 2-3 (court unable to find any indication legislature intended construction of identical standard to depend on when issue raised). Indeed,
the court has indicated that there is no distinction at all. See Mata v. State, 632 S.W.2d 355,

358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Torres v. State, 593 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Dinn v. State, 570 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
268. See Johnson, 564 S.W.2d at 712-13 (Odom, J., dissenting) (less showing for inquiry

than hearing).
269. It appears that a motion filed by defense counsel after the verdict but before sentencing was sufficient to raise the issue of incompetency in Williams. The trial court, however, also had before it substantial evidence of mental retardation that was introduced

during trial pursuant to the defendant's insanity defense. Williams v. State, 628 S.W.2d 848,
850-51 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982), afl'd, No. 098-83 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 18, 1984).
270. 640 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

271. TEX. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10.
272. 640 S.W.2d at 928; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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holding that transactional immunity is no longer mandated by article I,
section 10 of the state constitution, and that mere use immunity will be
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. 273 Transactional immunity provides complete protection
from prosecution for any
274
offenses relating to the witness's testimony.
Texas courts traditionally have required the granting of transactional
immunity to overcome the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 27 5 Such immunity has been required whether granted pursuant to
statutory provision 276 or a prosecutor's general power to grant immunity
with the approval of the court, conferred by the statutory provisions of
nolle prosequi. 277 Because virtually all Texas case authority requiring
transactional immunity was decided before the fifth amendment privilege
was made applicable to the states, 278 the immunity requirement clearly
was based on Texas's own constitutional privilege. 279 In 1972 the United
States Supreme Court held in Kastigar v. United States 280 that the fifth
amendment only requires the granting of "use" or "derivative use" immunity.281 Use immunity provides a lesser degree of protection to the witness, in that it only prevents the government from using the compelled
273. 640 S.W.2d at 928.
274. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443, 451-52 (1972) (distinguishing and
explaining transactional immunity).
275. 640 S.W.2d at 928.
276. See, e.g., Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 470-71, 179 S.W.2d 269, 275 (1944) (transactional immunity for juveniles under statute); Ferrantello v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 471, 481,
256 S.W.2d 587, 595 (1953) (transactional immunity for witnesses at legislative hearing
under statute); Exparte Muncy, 72 Tex. Crim. 541, 550, 562, 163 S.W. 29, 38, 44 (1913)
(transactional immunity under prosecutorial discretion statute); see also Ex parte Joseph,
172 Tex. Crim. 355, 358, 356 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (1962) (transactional immunity also covers
distinct offenses connected with crime).
277. See, e.g., Exparte Copeland, 91 Tex. Crim. 549, 557, 240 S.W. 314, 317 (1922)
(prosecutor could grant transactional immunity); Exparte Barnes, 73 Tex. Crim. 583, 584,
166 S.W. 728, 729 (1914) (transactional immunity within court's and prosecutor's joint
power); Exparte Muncy, 72 Tex. Crim. 541, 542, 163 S.W. 29, 41 (1913) (witness compelled
to testify after prosecutor grant of immunity approved by court); Exparte Napolean, 65 Tex.
Crim. 307, 309, 144 S.W. 269, 270 (1912) (witness not given immunity from prosecution did
not have to testify); cf. Carlisle v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 530, 532-33, 137 S.W.2d 782, 783
(1940) (error to refuse introduction of evidence of prosecutor's promise of immunity).
The prosecutor's power to grant immunity is conferred by the statutory provisions of nolle
prosequi. Although Texas courts and prosecutors have no inherent power to grant immunity, see Exparte Muncy, 72 Tex. Crim. 541, 542, 163 S.W. 29, 44-45 (1914) the nolle prosequi statutes have long been recognized as a legitimate basis for such authority, See, e.g., Ex
parte Joseph, 172 Tex. Crim. 355, 357, 356 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (1962) (authority derived
from nolle prosequi statute); Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 181, 22 S.W. 682, 682-83
(1893) (conviction overturned on defendant's plea of immunity pursuant to prosecution
agreement under nolle prosequi); Bowden v. State, 1 Tex. Crim. 137, 145 (1876).
278. The fifth amendment was not made applicable to the states until the decision in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
279. See Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), in which the court
observed that "pre-Malloy questions as to the scope of 'self-incrimination' provisions were
wholly matters of state law." Id at 762.
280. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
281. Id at 453; see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472, 475 (1972) (constitutionality of a state use immunity statute upheld same day as
Kasigar).
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testimony or evidence derived therefrom in subsequent criminal proceedings, but does not bar prosecution for offenses revealed by the
2 82
testimony.
In Shorthouse the court of criminal appeals was, for the first time,
squarely presented with a challenge to the validity of a statute conferring
only use immunity under the state constitution.2 83 While most Texas immunity statutes require the conferral of some degree of transactional immunity,2 84 or a combination of use and transactional immunity, 28 5 two
statutes allow only use immunity.2 86 Section 71.04 of the Penal Code, for
example, provides that one accused of engaging as a party in organized
criminal activity may be required to furnish evidence or testify in return
for use immunity. 287 It was this statute that the government invoked in
Shorthouse. In adopting the Kastigar rationale and concluding that section 71.04 is "co-extensive with the scope of self-incrimination as provided
in article I, § 10 of the State Constitution, 2 88 the court announced the
sweeping decree that the state constitutional privilege is henceforth to be
construed as synonymous in meaning and application to the federal privilege contained in the fifth amendment. 289 The court relied heavily on dictum in Olson v. State290 in which the court, in a different context, observed
that the state privilege was "similar" to the federal privilege, in that they
both have "common ancestry."' 29' The court in Shorthouse went one step
282. 406 U.S. at 442, 453. In such subsequent prosecution, the government has a heavy
burden of proving that the evidence it proposes to use was derived from independent
sources. Id. at 461.
283. The statute was attacked under art. I, § 10 of the state constitution. The Supreme
Court of Texas has had one occasion to make a similar assessment. In Dendy v. Wilson, 142
Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944), the court held a provision of the juvenile delinquency act
that only conferred use immunity insufficient to compel the minor defendants to testify on
the ground the state constitution requires transactional immunity. Id at 471-72, 179 S.W.2d
at 274-75.
284. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4015c (Vernon Supp. 1984) (prosecutions for
unauthorized use of passes, franks, and transportation); id. art. 5205 (Vernon 1971) (employment discrimination investigations); id art. 5221b-9(h) (Unemployment Compensation
Commission proceedings); id. art. 5429f(13) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (testimony before state
legislature); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.20 (Vernon 1968) (investigations concerning antitrust and other corporate violations); id § 23.22 (proceedings in assignment for creditors); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.05 (Vernon 1979) (courts of inquiry); TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 15.16 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (prosecutions for payment of an endorsing
editorial); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.48-2 (Vernon 1981) (violations of fire insurance laws).
285. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4505c (Vernon 1976) (prosecutions for solicitation of patients by doctors); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.06(b) (Vernon 1974) (prostitution
cases); id. § 47.09(b) (gambling cases).
286. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6471 (Vernon 1926) (proceedings before Railroad Commission); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.04(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (organized
crime prosecutions).
287. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 71.04(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides: "No evidence or
testimony required to be furnished under the provisions of this section nor any information
directly or indirectly derived from such evidence or testimony may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for aggravated perjury or contempt."
288. 640 S.W.2d at 928.
289. Id.
290. 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (opinion on motion for rehearing).
291. Id at 772. The Olson court determined that compelling a handwriting exemplar
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further, and thus clearly indicated that it intends to follow the precise dictates of the United States Supreme Court as to both federal and state constitutional law in the area of self-incrimination as well as search and
seizure.
IX.

GUILTY PLEAS

The most fundamental requisite to the validity of a guilty plea is that it
be voluntarily and knowingly made. A plea of guilty necessarily involves
the waiver of several vital constitutional rights. 292 The waiver, therefore,
must not only be free and voluntary, but must also consist of "knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. ' 293 The court of criminal appeals applied this basic tenet of due process in Exparte Young.294 In Young the

petitioner pled guilty and was sentenced pursuant to a plea bargain agreement providing for punishment of fifteen years confinement in the Texas
Department of Corrections. The record showed, however, that his attorney advised him prior to the entry of the plea that he would be eligible for
parole after three years, while in fact he would not be eligible until he had
served five years. 295 The court determined that the petitioner had relied
heavily on this misinformation in reaching his decision to enter the plea,
and found these facts sufficient to invalidate the conviction. 296 Even
though eligibility for parole is a collateral consequence of the entry of a
guilty plea, and a defendant is not entitled to be informed of such eligibility by the trial court, 297 the court decided that "if the defendant is grossly
misinformed about his parole eligibility date by his attorney, and the defendant relies upon that misinformation to the extent that it induces him to
does not constitute compelling an accused to give evidence against himself in violation of the
Texas constitutional privilege embodied in TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
292. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). In Boykin the United States
Supreme Court stated:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes
place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth ...
Second, is the right to trial by jury ....
Third is the right to confront one's

accusers.
Id. (citations omitted).
293. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). This underlying principle is embodied in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1966-1983),

which provides: "No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court
unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and
voluntary."
294. 644 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The appellant attacked his conviction by way
of a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

11.07 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1984).
295. Because petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, he was ineligible for credit
for good time under the provisions of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(b)
(Vernon 1979).

296. 644 S.W.2d at 4.
297. See Rose v. State, 465 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
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plead guilty or nolo contendere, his plea may be rendered involuntary. '298
The court of criminal appeals has increasingly attached the incidents of
ordinary contractual agreements to plea bargains. Following the lead of
the federal courts, the court has held that plea bargaining, the process by
which the prosecution makes concessions such as lower punishment recommendations, reduction of counts, or dismissal of other charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea, "flows from 'the mutuality of
advantage' ",299 to both sides, who in essence become parties to a "contract.' 3°° Once the trial court announces that it will abide by the agreement, both the state 30 ' and the defendant 302 are bound to carry out their
respective sides. The court of criminal appeals has thus remarked that
when a plea bargain is not kept, the proper relief is either withdrawal of
the plea or specific enforcement of the agreement, depending on the circumstances in each case. 30 3 Opinions issued by the court of criminal appeals during the survey period indicate, however, that defendants may
derive little benefit from this peculiar brand of contract law. In Ex parte
Wih'ams 3°4 the court invoked the maxim that parties to a contract are presumed to deal at arm's length and thus the terms of their agreements will
not be disturbed unless these terms appear manifestly unjust. 30 5 The petitioner in Williams pled guilty to felony theft under a plea bargain agreement that provided for ten years' probation if he would pay $10,000 in
restitution and fines prior to sentencing. If the petitioner failed to make
the payment, the agreement called for ten years' imprisonment. The petitioner was unable to make the payment in time, and at sentencing requested the court to allow him to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied
the request and imposed a ten-year sentence. 30 6 A divided court of criminal appeals dismissed Williams's equal protection claim, 30 7 observing that
"'[e]qual protection does not free those who made a bad assessment of
risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decision.' "308 The
court also overruled the petitioner's challenges based on due process, lack
of voluntariness, and violation of public policy, noting that he arguably
possessed relatively equal bargaining power in striking his deal with the
"

298. 644 S.W.2d at 5.
299. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). See generally Blackledge v. Al-

lison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (discussing collateral attack of guilty pleas).
300. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d
687, 689 (5th Cir. 1978).
301. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); DeRusse v. State, 579
S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
302. Joiner v. State, 578 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
303. Id.

304. 637 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
305. Id. at 948.
306. Id. at 945.

307. The petitioner specifically contended that the plea bargain created a disparity in
sentence between an indigent and a person financially capable of paying the fine and restitution. Id. at 948; see Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot,
439 U.S. 1041 (1978) (unconstitutionality of conditioning sentence on immediate payment of

bargained-for fine); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
308. 637 S.W.2d at 948 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 226 (1978)).
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309
state, and ultimately got what he bargained for.
Breach of a plea bargain "contract" by the state provided the petitioner
with a seemingly hollow victory in Ex Parte Green.310 Green pled guilty
under a plea bargain agreement that included a promise by the state not to
prosecute his brother. After the petitioner entered his plea and was duly
convicted, the state nevertheless proceeded to prosecute his brother. The
court determined that the state had violated the express terms of the agreement, but only set aside the petitioner's conviction and remanded for further prosecution. 31' The court's determination did not affect the validity
of the brother's conviction.

X.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Estelle v. Smith 3 12 continues
to have a significant impact in the areas of the right to counsel as well as
the right against self-incrimination. In Smith the United States Supreme
Court held, among other things, that a defendant represented by an attorney is denied his sixth amendment right to counsel when he is given a
pretrial psychiatric interview without notice to his attorney. 3 13 The Court
reasoned that when the results of such an interview are later used in an
attempt to obtain the death penalty, the defendant should have his attor3 14
ney's assistance in deciding whether to submit to the interview.
31
5
In Parker v. State the court of criminal appeals considered the application of Estelle v. Smith to a noncapital case 316 wherein the defendant
also raised the defense of insanity. 31 7 In Parker the appellant's attorney
requested a psychiatric evaluation of his client on the issues of competency
to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. 3 18 The trial court appointed Dr. Richard Coons to examine the appellant. Dr. Coons reported
that Parker was competent to stand trial, but insane at the time of the
commission of the offense. After Dr. Coons's report, the state had the appellant examined in jail by Dr. John Holbrook, without a court order or
notice to appellant's counsel. Contrary to Dr. Coons, Dr. Holbrook found
the appellant to have been sane at the time of the offense. Prior to trial the
appellant filed a motion to suppress Dr. Holbrook's testimony. The trial
court denied the motion, but ordered the state to provide appellant with a
copy of Dr. Holbrook's report. The state delivered the report on the day of
309. 637 S.W.2d at 948-52.
310. 644 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

311. Id.
312. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
313. Id. at 471.
314. Id at 469-71.
315. 649 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (opinion on remand from United States
Supreme Court, 453 U.S. 902 (1981)).
316. Appellant was charged with burglary of a habitation in violation of TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
317. Id § 8.01; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03, § 2 (Vernon 1979).
318. See TEX. CRIM. CODE PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 3(a), art. 46.03, § 3(a) (Vernon 1979)
(examination of defendant for incompetency and insanity).
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trial, claiming that it had just been received. During the trial, appellant
called Dr. Coons to testify that in his opinion Parker was insane. In rebuttal, the state called Dr. Holbrook, who was allowed to testify over objection. No objections, however, were made on fifth or sixth amendment
grounds.
The court of criminal appeals held that the appellant waived his fifth
amendment protection for the psychiatric interview by offering testimony
on the defense of insanity. 31 9 The court then considered whether the sixth
amendment right to counsel had been violated. After quoting at length
from Estelle v. Smith, the court found that appellant was denied his right
to counsel because the interview was conducted after appellant had been
indicted, and without any notice to his attorney. 320 The court, however,
found that this denial of counsel did not constitute reversible error. 32' Appellant's counsel knew of the Holbrook interview because he moved to
suppress Dr. Holbrook's testimony. Parker's counsel also received a copy
of Dr. Holbrook's report two days before his testimony. With notice of the
content of Dr. Holbrook's testimony, appellant proceeded to raise the defense of insanity by expert testimony. Based upon these factors the court
held that "[i]t would be absurd to hold that appellant waived his Fifth
Amendment rights but he could still use the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment right to prevent the
322
State from using rebuttal testimony arising out of the flawed interview.
The court of criminal appeals apparently held that the appellant was not
harmed by the denial of his sixth amendment right to counsel. This conclusion would be correct had Dr. Holbrook's interview been court-ordered. 323 In that situation the appellant would have no legitimate right to
refuse to submit to the examination or limit the use of the psychiatrist's
findings because the denial of his attorney's assistance as to whether to
submit and as to what ends the evidence could be used could cause appellant no harm. 3 24 In Parker, however, the court did not authorize Dr. Holbrook's interview. Without a court order the appellant was not obliged to
allow Dr. Holbrook to examine him. His attorney, had he been properly
notified, could have advised Parker of his right to refuse, and thus prevent
Dr. Holbrook from obtaining the evidence ultimately used in defeating his
the harm in denying apclient's insanity defense. This analysis evidences
325
pellant his sixth amendment right to counsel.
319. 649 S.W.2d at 52. The court declined to attach any significance to the fact that Dr.
Holbrook examined the appellant without any court authorization. The lack of court authorization should perhaps require a different result since the appellant could have refused
to submit to the examination in the absence of a court order. Dr. Holbrook's examination as
an agent of the state arguably involved custodial interrogation as defined in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), thereby requiring warnings as to Parker's right to remain
silent and his right to counsel. Id
320. 649 S.W.2d at 52-53.
321. Id at 53.
322. Id.
323. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 3(a), art. 46.03, § 3(a) (Vernon 1979).
324. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
325. The court also held that appellant's failure to object on fifth and sixth amendment
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The court of criminal appeals more clearly applied the holding of Smith
and the right to counsel in Mays v. State, 326 a capital murder case. At the
time of his examination by Dr. James Grigson, the appellant was represented by counsel just as was the defendant in Smith. In contrast, however, Dr. Grigson conducted his interview pursuant to a court order issued
after a hearing. Also unlike Smith, Mays raised issues as to his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the crime. The court did
not find these differences controlling since appellant's counsel, although
notified of Dr. Grigson's examination, was not told that the examination
would involve evidence of appellant's future dangerousness
for use at the
327
punishment phase of appellant's capital trial.

The State argued that Smith did not apply because Dr. Grigson did not
actually give an opinion as to appellant's future dangerousness, or the
probability that appellant would continue to commit acts of violence. The
court rejected this argument, finding that Dr. Grigson's testimony characterizing appellant as a high degree incurable sociopath conveyed his opinion as to Mays's future dangerousness. 328 The real import of the sixth
amendment right in Smith was notice to the defendant's attorney of the
issues that would be encompassed in the psychiatric examination. In Mays
the appellant's attorney knew that his client would be examined for competency and sanity, but did not know that the state also intended to use Dr.
Grigson to prove that the appellant deserved the death penalty. This violation of Mays's sixth amendment rights required the reversal of his
329
conviction.
The right to counsel also encompasses the right to effective assistance by
counsel. 330 In Exparte McCormick 33' the court of criminal appeals held
that two jointly tried capital murder defendants were denied effective
assistance because their representation involved a conflict of interest that
adversely affected their attorneys' performance. 33 2 The two defendants,
McCormick and McMahon, retained the same attorneys to represent them
in the capital murder trial. The attorneys never explained the possible
grounds failed to preserve the error, if any, even though under Texas law the objection
would have been futile. 649 S.W.2d at 55; see exparte English, 642 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982) (judgment reversed even though appellant failed to preserve error); Ex parte
Demouchette, 633 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (reversal, though no contemporaneous objection at trial). The court found that under Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982)
futility of the objection alone did not excuse a failure to voice a contemporaneous objection.
649 S.W.2d at 54. To the Parker court, the Engle holding indicated that a defendant could
waive rights established by Smith. Id at 54-55.
326. 653 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
327. Id. at 33.
328. Id at 34.
329. Id at 35.
330. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1980); Exparte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507,
516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
331. 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
332. Id at 806. The court relied upon Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant is deprived of his sixth
amendment right to counsel when he shows that his attorney's representation of multiple
clients creates a conflict of interest that adversely affected the attorney's performance.

SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 38

conflicts inherent in the joint representation and successfully opposed the
state's motion for separate trials, which would have required the attorneys
333
to withdraw and refund a portion of their fees.
During trial the state introduced only McMahon's confession, thus precluding the defensive strategy of attacking both defendants' confessions as
invalid. The attorneys had planned to argue that McCormick's confession
was the result of a promise not to seek the death penalty, and that McMahon's confession was made after being shown McCormick's tainted confession that implicated him. When the prosecution only admitted McMahon's confession, the attorneys decided to help McMahon by eliciting the
fact of McCormick's confession. To help McCormick, though, they argued
that he had not received any substantial remuneration in this murder for
hire case, leaving the clear implication that McMahon had received most
of the payment. The defense attorneys also failed to individualize jury
consideration of the defendants' culpability and propensity for continuing
dangerousness. 334 These examples of how the joint representation adversely affected the defendants entitled them to postconviction habeas
335
corpus relief.
Another case demonstrating the denial of the effective assistance of
counsel is Exparte Dunham.336 Dunham was charged with unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle, 337 enhanced by two prior felonies. 338 His attorney
convinced him to waive trial by jury because the attorney was physically
and mentally exhausted after several jury trials and was unprepared to
voir dire the jury panel. At the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing the attorney admitted that he knew at the time of trial this was in no way advantageous to Dunham. The court stated that such bad legal advice on a
matter as important as the right to a jury trial could never be considered a
matter of trial strategy. The court therefore held that such abdication of
attorney responsibility to protect his client's best interest sufficiently consti339
tuted unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
A similar, though more appalling, situation occurred in Miles v. State.340
In Miles the appellant was convicted of attempted murder and received a
sentence of fifteen years and one day. The appellant's court-appointed
counsel inexplicably failed to ask a single question of the jury panel during
voir dire. The El Paso court of appeals found that this failure could only
333. 645 S.W.2d at 803-04.
334. Such a jury argument would have aided the jury in answering the death penalty
special issues set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981).

335. 645 S.W.2d at 806.
336. 650 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
337. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1979).

338. Id § 12.42(d) provides:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous
felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by
confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.
339. 650 S.W.2d at 827.
340. 644 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no pet.).
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be evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. 34' The court, however, did
not rest the reversal of the appellant's conviction solely on this ground.
The appellant's attorney also opened the door at the punishment stage of
the trial to proof by the state of the appellant's arrest record, of which his
counsel was apparently unaware. The attorney also waived argument on
punishment even though appellant was eligible for probation and had a
family to support. The court determined that these actions or inactions by
the appellant's attorney denied the appellant the reasonably effective
assistance of counsel to which he was entitled under the sixth
342
amendment.
XI.

SENTENCING

Problems in sentencing often arise regarding the evidence presented to a
judge or jury to aid them in making their decision. Sometimes more than
the usual concern of admissibility is involved.

Tamminen v. State 343

presents such a situation. In Tamminen the appellant, a former member of
the Bandidos motorcycle gang, was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape,
and elected to have the judge assess his punishment. Before sentencing,
the prosecutor provided the trial judge with a confidential Department of
Public Safety report on the Bandidos that contained appellant's name.
The judge refused to allow the appellant's attorneys to review the report
when they discovered it in the judge's office. At sentencing the judge explicitly disclaimed any reliance on the report and, instead, insisted that the
ninety-nine-year sentence was based solely on the testimony of the two
3
complainants. "
The San Antonio court of appeals vacated the sentence and remanded
for sentencing by another district judge. 345 In its opinion the court severely rebuked the prosecutor and the trial judge for their actions regarding the Bandidos report. The court labeled the prosecutor's ex parte act of
providing the report to the judge as "reprehensible prosecutorial misconduct" 346 and described the judge's acceptance of the document as judicial

misconduct. 347 The court then held that this misconduct violated the ap-

pellant's right of confrontation and right to a public trial. 34 8 Even ac-

cepting the trial court's disclaimer at sentencing, the court determined that
in order to maintain the appearance that justice had been done, the sentence must be vacated and the resentencing performed by another
349
judge.
341. Id. at 24.
342. Id. at 25.
343. 644 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982), rev'd in part, afd in part, 653

S.W.2d
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

799, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
644 S.W.2d at 218.
Id
Id at 217.
Id
Id

349. Id

at 218.
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Both the state and the appellant successfully petitioned the court of
criminal appeals to review the court of appeals' decision. The court's plurality opinion left undisturbed the court of appeals' findings of
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct.3 50 The court of criminal appeals,
however, refused to hold that the judge's misconduct denied the appellant
his due process rights. 35' The court noted that substantial evidence of the
Bandidos organization and the appellant's past association therewith had
been offered at the punishment phase of the trial. The court also noted
that no evidence was presented indicating that the trial judge read the classified report. The court, therefore, found it unjustified to conclude that the
trial judge conducted an elaborate charade by claiming not to have consid352
ered the report.
Presiding Judge Onion, joined by Judge W.C. Davis, concurred wholly
in the result, but used a different analysis to reach that result. He found
that error, if any, was not preserved because there was no evidence that the
trial court considered the report, no evidence to overcome the presumption
that the court disregarded inadmissible evidence, no objection at the penalty hearing, and the complaint on motion for new trial differed from that
urged on appeal. 35 3 Further, any error was rendered harmless by the other
evidence concerning the Bandidos that was admitted without objection, as
well as by common knowledge of the reputation of the Bandidos. 3 54 Judge
Onion dissented from the approval of the court of appeals' findings of judicial misconduct because no showing was made that the judge improperly
considered the report. 355 Judge Teague dissented in a strongly worded
opinion that fully endorsed the court of appeals' holding as necessary to
ensure the appearance that justice was accomplished in the sentencing of
356
appellant.
A more common evidentiary question at punishment occurred in Acosta
v. State. 357 In Acosta the appellant challenged the admission of two prior
California felony convictions used to support the enhancement allegations
in his indictment on the ground that the state failed to prove that the convictions were the result of a valid waiver of indictment. The court of appeals accepted the appellant's claim that the convictions were void under
Texas law without proof of a valid waiver of indictment 358 and that Cali359
fornia law, absent contrary evidence, was presumed to be the same.
350. Tamminen v. State, 653 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Judge Clinton
wrote for the plurality.
351. Id
352. Id. at 803.
353. Id. at 806-07.
354. Id.at 807.
355. Id. at 808.
356. Id at 808-09.
357. 654 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), rev'd, 650 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983).
358. 654 S.W.2d at 14; see TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.141 (Vernon 1977)
(waiver of indictment for noncapital felony).
359. See Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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On the state's petition for discretionary review, a sharply divided court
of criminal appeals reversed and affirmed the conviction. 360 Judge W.C.
Davis, writing for a three-man plurality, held the California convictions
admissible since the appellant failed to prove the prior convictions void
36 1
because they were tried on informations rather than indictments.
Presuming California and Texas law to be the same, the court stated that
the appellant could have been tried on an information after a valid waiver
of indictment. In this collateral attack, however, 362
the appellant had the
waiver.
valid
of
lack
the
demonstrating
of
burden
Presiding Judge Onion filed a concurring opinion joined by Judge
Campbell. 363 After reviewing several cases dealing with the validity of
prior convictions used for enhancement, Judge Onion found that the prior
convictions were not void in the absence of proof by appellant that the
previous convictions lacked valid waivers of indictment. 364 Furthermore,
the appellant's objection concerning one of the exhibits lacked merit
since
365
waiver was not a prerequisite to the admission of the judgment.
Judge Clinton, in his concurring opinion, viewed the court of appeals'
holding as based on the state's failure to prove its enhancement allegations, rather than on the inadmissibility of the exhibits proving the prior
convictions. 366 If Texas law was presumed the same as California law, the
state would be required to prove valid waivers of indictment to demonstrate that the information was legally pending in a court with jurisdiction.
Because the question of whether the information is legally pending is a
question of law, however, and because appellate courts could ascertain
with reasonable certainty the law of another state, the court could determine, by looking at California law, that all charges in California may be
prosecuted by information without a waiver of indictment. Judge Clinton
thus concluded that the rebuttable presumption that the law of other states
is the same as Texas law should no longer be applied, and that because a
waiver of indictment is unnecessary under California law, the failure to
prove such a waiver did not, in this case, render the evidence on the en367
hancement counts insufficient.
The dissent, written by Judge Miller, found the court of appeals' decision correct because the prosecution failed to show that the appellant had
validly waived indictment. 368 The dissent argued that to attack the conviction, Texas law required the appellant to prove that he was not tried upon
an indictment and that he did not waive his constitutional right to indictment. 369 The state's exhibits affirmatively demonstrated that the appellant
360. 650 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
361. Id at 828-29.
362. Id

363.
364.
365.
366.

Id at 829.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 834-36. Judge Clinton was joined in his concurrence by Judge McCormick.

367. Id. at 837.
368. Id at 838. Judge Teague joined the dissent.

369. Id. at 838 (citing Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Chancy
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was convicted on an information, not an indictment. The appellant introduced California court records, devoid of evidence of a waiver, to prove he
had not waived the indictment. Relying on Carn/ey v. Cochran,370 Justice
Miller stated that a waiver of a constitutional right could not be presumed
on a silent record. He concluded that the appellant had therefore met his
burden of proving the convictions constitutionally37 1defective and that the
court of appeals should thus have been affirmed.
In the penalty stage of a criminal trial the order of procedure is the same
as at the guilt/innocence stage. 372 The first step taken at the punishment
stage when enhancement allegations are involved, therefore, is the reading
of the indictment to the jury and the entry of the defendant's plea of "true"
or "not true" to the allegations therein. 373 In Welch v. State374 the court of
criminal appeals discussed the impact of the state's introduction of critical
evidence in the enhancement allegations before the defendant has pled to
the indictment. The jury in Welch convicted the appellant of aggravated
rape. 375 At the punishment phase of the trial the state called two witnesses
before noticing that it had failed to read the enhancement allegations to
the jury and have the appellant enter his plea. The trial court then read
the enhancement allegations, but the appellant moved to strike the testimony of the state's witnesses given before the entry of appellant's plea of
not true. The trial court overruled the motion to strike. 376 The court of
criminal appeals reversed the appellant's conviction because of the trial
court's failure to grant the motion to strike and its failure to require the
state to reintroduce or obtain a stipulation of the evidence so that the evidence would be properly before the jury. 377 The court determined that the
jury's consideration of the improperly presented evidence was harmful because that evidence was the only testimony matching Welch's fingerprints
to those in the exhibit proving one of his prior convictions. 378
Judge McCormick's dissent 379 criticized the majority for failing to rely
on Bush v. State. 380 In Bush the court of criminal appeals approved the
trial court's finding of the truth of the enhancement allegations based
solely on evidence from the guilt phase of the trial. 38' The dissent would
have followed the Bush holding and affirmed the conviction. 382 It failed,
v. State, 614 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Tinney v. State, 578 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Rains, 555 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
370. 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (waiver of right to counsel may not be presumed from a
silent record).
371. 650 S.W.2d at 839.
372. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(b) (Vernon 1981).
373. Id art. 36.01(1).
374. 645 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 285.
377. Id. For a discussion of the correct procedure, see Trammell v. State, 445 S.W.2d
190, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
378. 645 S.W.2d at 285.
379. Id at 286.
380. 642 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
381. Id. at 789.
382. 645 S.W.2d at 286.
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however, to realize that the enhancement evidence in Bush was presented
during the trial on guilt or innocence. In Welch the evidence in question
was not presented during either phase of the trial since the prosecution
entered it after the guilty verdict but before the enhancement plea. These
trial references of plea and verdict mark the boundaries within which the
383
jury may consider !he evidence.
XII.

EXTRADITION

The court of criminal appeals decided a question of first impression in
Exparte Sanchez,3 84 in holding that Texas courts can go behind the governor's rendition warrant and make their own determination as to whether
probable cause exists in the demanding state, at least when the record fails
to reflect that such determination was previously made. 385 Under section 3
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,38 6 adopted in Texas as article

51.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,3 87 the executive authority and
courts of an asylum state may honor a demanding state's requisition only

if the accused is "substantially charge[d] . . . with having committed a

crime under the law of that State. ' 38 8 Extradition can only be contested by
writ of habeas corpus and a hearing limited to the legality of the extradition proceeding itself. Inquiry into issues dealing with the guilt or innocence of the accused is not permitted. 38 9 In Michigan v. Doran390 the
United States Supreme Court implicitly required some judicial determination of probable cause before an accused found in an asylum state may be
extradited. 39 1 In Doran a justice of the peace of the demanding state had
issued a warrant ostensibly based on probable cause, but had failed to set
out sufficient facts to support that conclusion. The Michigan Supreme
Court sustained the accused's habeas challenge to the proceeding. 392 In
reversing the Michigan court, the United States Supreme Court observed
that the courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding
state's determination of probable cause since "the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the traditional presumption of regularity."' 393

This ruling, consistent with the constitutional and statutory

383. Id at 285 n.1.
384. 642 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
385. Id. at 812.
386. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982); see U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (privileges and
immunities).
387. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13 (Vernon 1979).
388. Id § 3.
389. Exparte Jennings, 434 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 20 (Vernon 1979) (prohibiting the asylum state from considering guilt or innocence of the accused).
390. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
391. Id at 290; see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 449 (1981) (remedial provisions
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers give prisoners a limited right to a judicial hearing
on the receiving state's custody request).
392. People v. Doran, 401 Mich. 235, 258 N.W.2d 406, 413 (1977).
393. 439 U.S. at 290. The Court specifically ruled that:
[W]hen a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that
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purposes of extradition proceedings, left open the question of the asylum
state court's authority to make a probable cause inquiry when no such
determination of probable cause is shown to have been rendered in the
demanding state.
In Sanchez the court of criminal appeals found nothing in the record to
show affirmatively that a judicial determination of probable cause had
been made in the demanding state. 394 The court also found no prohibition
in Doran precluding Texas courts from making that determination them396
selves 395 if the issue was timely and properly raised by the accused.
Thus, a person upon whom extradition is sought will now be entitled to
discharge from custody if the Texas habeas court finds that probable cause
in the demanding state does not exist, or that sufficient evidence on which
397
to make the determination is not available.
The Dallas court of appeals subsequently reached the same result in a
different way in Exparte Blankenship .398 The Dallas court struck down a
warrant issued upon an affidavit made before a district attorney instead of
a magistrate. 399 The state introduced the warrant at the habeas hearing to
establish its prima facie case for extradition. 4°° The state, however, destroyed that showing by also introducing supporting papers that revealed
the insufficiency of the warrant issued in the demanding state. 40 Without
probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state are without power to review the determination....
•.. [O]nce the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for
extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the
asylum state.
Id
394. 642 S.W.2d at 811.
395. Id at 812. The court found support for its conclusion in State v. Uttech, 31 Wis. 2d
664, 143 N.W.2d 500, 505, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956 (1966), which reached the same result
under similar facts. See Battles v. State, 389 So. 2d 957, 960 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981). See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 1085 (1979) (necessity that
demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive).
396. 642 S.W.2d at 811. The issue is presumably raised by specific averment in the application for writ of habeas corpus.
397. Id. at 812. Regrettably, both the Supreme Court in Doran and the court of criminal
appeals in Sanchez failed to discuss the critical question of the fourth amendment's application and significance in the extradition context. A compelling argument could be advanced
that the fourth amendment alone imposes a duty upon the courts of an asylum state to make
an independent probable cause determination, at least where evidence is insufficient to
prove adequately a previous and adequate determination in the demanding state. Nevertheless, some resolution and accommodation of the competing constitutional provisions of the
extradition clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, and the fourth amendment would have been
appropriate. see Doran, 439 U.S. at 290-98 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Sanchez, 642 S.W.2d
at 812 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (for extradition, affidavit must present facts evidencing probable cause).
398. 651 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, pet. ref d).
399. Id. at 431.
400. Texas courts have long held that introduction of a governor's warrant, regular on its
face, is sufficient to make out a prima facie case for extradition. See Exparte Nelson, 594
S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Exparte Sykes, 400 S.W.2d 568, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
401. Although the state may introduce the supporting papers to support a prima facie
case for extradition, Exparte Stehling, 481 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), the
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resorting to a probable cause analysis as authorized in Sanchez, the Blankenship court simply held that the express statutory requirements of the Extradition Act were not complied with. 40 2 Section 3 of the Extradition Act
provides that the asylum state's governor can honor the request for extradition on an affidavit and warrant issued in the demanding state only when
the affidavit is made before a magistrate. 40 3 The court therefore found the
instant warrant, issued upon a complaint executed before a district attor40 4
ney, insufficient to permit an order of extradition.
In ExparteHenson ,405 a case involving the issue of identity, the court of
criminal appeals relaxed the quantum of proof necessary under the state's
burden of showing that the person held in custody is the same person
named in the warrant. A presumption of identity generally arises when
the name of the accused is the same as that set out in the warrant, and the
burden of proof on the identity issue is on the accused. 40 6 Once the ac40 8
cused places identity in issue, 40 7 however, the burden shifts to the state.
The prosecution normally attempts to satisfy this burden by introducing a
photograph or set of fingerprints that have been authenticated by the demanding state. Such photographs are sufficient for this purpose when affidavits accompanying them clearly identify the person in the photograph as
the same person who allegedly committed the offense for which extradition
is requested, and the trial court finds that the person depicted therein is the
same as the accused. 40 9 Such evidence has been considered insufficient to
supporting papers can also be used to defeat the prima facie case if they contradict the
allegations contained in the governor's warrant. Exparte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); Exparte Wilson, 437 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
402. 651 S.W.2d at 431.
403. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 3 (Vernon 1979) provides that the demanding state's requisition must be accompanied by:
a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the
State having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit before a
magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which issued thereupon;
or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution
thereof ....
See also Exparte Rosenthal, 515 S.W.2d 114, 119 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (interpreting
§ 3 of the Extradition Act).
404. 651 S.W.2d at 431.
405. 639 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
406. See Exparte Smith, 515 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
407. Identity may be placed in issue by an affidavit of the accused stating he is not the
same person named in the governor's warrant, see Exparte Spencer, 567 S.W.2d 520, 522
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978), or by testimony by the accused to that effect, see Expare Larson,
494 S.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
408. Exparte Martinez, 530 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Expare Parker,
515 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
409. See, e.g., Exparte Viduari, 525 S.W.2d 163, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (affidavit
accompanying photograph stated that the person depicted therein was John Viduari who
was in St. Louis County, Missouri, on December 26, 1973, and who was the defendant in
cause no. 351688 in the circuit court of St. Louis County, the case for which extradition was
requested); Exparte Landers, 366 S.W.2d 567, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (affidavit identified attached photograph as that of one of persons who committed robbery for which extradition was sought and with same name as one of the accused's aliases); Exparte O'Connor,
169 Tex. Crim. 579, 580, 336 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1960) (affidavit executed by a store detective
identified picture of accused as "Oliver O'Connor who was arrested by me in August of
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prove identity, however, if the record fails to reflect such specific verification or a finding that the photograph actually depicts the person then in
custody. 4 10 In Henson the affidavit supporting probable cause merely
stated that the individual named therein and shown in an attached photograph was the same as the person against whom criminal charges had been
filed in the demanding state. The affidavit contained no allegation that the
person depicted in the photograph was charged with the crime for which
extradition was requested, and the trial court record contained no findings
identifying the accused as the man in the picture. Implicitly holding that
in this context an unequivocal and specific identification is no longer required, the court of criminal appeals found the evidence on the issue of
identity sufficient. 41 The court also expressly overruled prior case authority and held that the trial court, as fact finder, need not make a specific
finding matching the accused and the person in the photograph. 41 2 While
such a finding might clarify the record, the court concluded that the trial
court's decision on identity was implicit in its ruling denying habeas
413
relief.
In Curry v. Ater 4 14 the court of criminal appeals was called upon to decide the applicability of the provisions for legislative continuance to extradition proceedings. After obtaining several delays in his extradition writ
hearing, the accused in Curry hired a state senator as co-counsel. On the
date set for hearing, the senator filed a motion for continuance under the
provisions of article 2168.415 The judge presiding at the habeas corpus
1955" for offense charged in the extradition request); see also Ex parte Mackerman, 376
S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex. Crim App. 1964) (court held mistaken middle-name immaterial); Ex
parte Green, 170 Tex. Crim. 311, 311-12, 340 S.W.2d 821, 821-22 (1960) (sworn affidavit
charging "Fred L. Green" with forgery).
410. See Exparte Spencer, 567 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Exparte Smith,
515 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
411. 639 S.W.2d at 701.
412. Id The court stated that "[i]nsofar as [they are] in conflict with this holding, Ex
parte Spencer . . . and Ex parte Smith . . . are overruled." Id (citations omitted).
413. Id.
414. 648 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
415. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
In all suits, either civil or criminal, or in matters of probate, pending in any
court of this State, and in all matters ancillary to such suits which require
action by or the attendance of an attorney, including appeals but excluding
temporary restraining orders, at any time within thirty (30) days of a date
when the Legislature is to be in Session, or at any time the Legislature is in
Session, or when the Legislature sits as a Constitutional Convention, it shall
be mandatory that the court continue such cause if it shall appear to the court,
by affidavit, that any party applying for such continuance, or any attorney for
any party to such cause, is a Member of either branch of the Legislature, and
will be or is in actual attendance on a Session of the same. If the member of
the Legislature is an attorney for a party to such cause, his affidavit shall contain a declaration that it is his intention to participate actively in the preparation and/or presentation of the case. Where a party to any cause or an
attorney for any party to such cause is a Member of the Legislature, his affidavit need not be corroborated. On the filing of such affidavit, the court shall
continue the cause until thirty (30) days after the adjournmment of the Legislature and such affidavit shall be proof of the necessity for such continuance,
and such continuance shall be deemed one of right and shall not be charged
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proceeding denied the motion.4 16 The court of criminal appeals noted that
the granting of a legislative motion for continuance that conforms with the
statutory
requirements is mandatory and applies in all criminal or civil
' 4 17
"suits.

Although an exception to this rule is recognized where a "sub-

stantial existing right would be defeated or abridged by extended continuances, '4 18 the court of criminal appeals observed that the demanding state
failed to show how any rights might be defeated by the delay. 4 19 The
court, therefore, held that because a habeas corpus proceeding is a "suit"
within the meaning of the statute and because the motion complied with
the requirements prescribed therein, the trial court should have granted
4 20
the motion for legislative continuance.
XIII.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Since September 1, 1981, the various courts of appeals have had jurisdiction over criminal as well as civil appeals. 42' Previously, as the courts
of civil appeals, the intermediate appellate courts were limited to consideration only of appeals from civil cases. 422 In 1980, however, article V, sec-

tion 6 of the Texas Constitution was amended to delete this jurisdictional
limitation and the legislature created a new statutory scheme for appeals. 423 This new appellate scheme provided for appeals in criminal cases

from the trial courts to the courts of appeals,
followed by discretionary
424
review by the court of criminal appeals.
against the party receiving such continuance upon any subsequent application
for continuance. It is hereby declared to be the intention of the Legislature
that the provisions of this Section shall be deemed mandatory and not discre-

tionary.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right to such continuance, where such
continuance is based upon an attorney in such cause being a member of the
Legislature, shall be discretionary with the Court in the following situations
and under the following circumstances, and none other, to wit:
(1) Where such attorney was employed within 10 days of the date such
suit is set for trial.
416. 648 S.W.2d at 11-12.
417. Id. at 12 (citing Mora v. Ferguson, 145 Tex. 498, 505, 199 S.W.2d 759, 763 (1947);
Glover v. State, 532 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Cuellar v. State, 521 S.W.2d
277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon Supp.
1984).
418. Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1977).
419. 648 S.W.2d at 12.
420. Id; see Exparte Browder, 373 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
421. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 states: "Said Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all cases of
which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under
such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law." See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. arts. 4.01, 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
422. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1891, amended 1980) stated: "Said Court of Civil Appeals
shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts,
which shall extend to all civil cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have
original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law." Id (emphasis added).
423. Act of Sept. 1, 1981, ch. 291, §§ 102-103, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 761, 802.
424. See id For analysis of the new appellate scheme, see Dally & Brockway, Changesin
Appellate Review in Criminal Cases Following the 1980 Constitutional Amendment, 13 ST.
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One unforeseen problem with this new scheme has surfaced during this
survey period. In amending article V, section 6 to allow the courts of appeals to decide criminal matters, the drafters left untouched that section's
proviso that states: "Provided, that the decision of said courts shall by
conclusive on all questions offact brought before them on appeal or error. '425 In In re King's Estate426 the Texas Supreme Court set out the
meaning of this provision in the context of civil cases. The supreme court
in that case decided that this provision allowed the courts of civil appeals
to resolve fact questions and set aside verdicts that were against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence. 4 27 Such a factual determination was not subject to review by the supreme court, which was limited to
consideration of claims that there was no428evidence to support a verdict
since that was a question of law not fact.
This procedure differed from that used in the review of the sufficiency of
the evidence in criminal cases. In White v. State429 the court of criminal
appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider complaints that a conviction was against the weight and preponderance of the evidence. 430 The
court found that the proviso of article V, section 6 applied only to the
courts of civil appeals and gave no authority to the court of criminal appeals to review evidence in that manner. 43 I The only standard of review in
criminal cases is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational factfinder could have found all of the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 432 With the combination of criminal and civil appeals in the intermediate courts, however, a
conflict in these procedures became likely.
This conflict occurred in Combs v. State433 in which the Houston court
of appeals reversed Combs's conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial. 434 The court of appeals held that the trial court should have granted
a mistrial because the state failed to prove that the cause of death was
drowning as alleged in the indictment for murder. 435 The court did not
discuss article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution or the weight and
preponderance of the evidence.
MARY'S L.J. 211 (1981); McColl & McColoch,CriminalPost-TrialandAppellate Procedure.
Practice Under the New Texas Rules, 44 TEX. B.J. 1208 (1981).
425. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (emphasis added).
426. 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
427. Id at 664, 244 S.W.2d at 662.
428. Id.
429. 591 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

430. ld at 856.
431. Id

432. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Banks v. State, 510
S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
433. 631 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]), rey'd, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1982), afl'd, 652 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1983).
434. 631 S.W.2d at 538.
435. Id. The court also held that the appellant had not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel prior to confessing. Id. at 535-57.
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The state obtained discretionary review of the court of appeals' decision
by the court of criminal appeals.4 36 The court of criminal appeals, apparently on its own, raised the application of article V, section 6 and framed
the issue as follows:
At the outset, we must decide whether our Court has jurisdiction to
review sufficiency questions once they have been passed on by the
Courts of Appeals. . . . If sufficiency of the evidence is a "question
of fact," then the decisions of the Court of Appeals437on sufficiency
questions would appear to be binding on our Court.
The court then discussed the practice developed in civil cases interpreting questions of fact in article V, section 6 to mean questions of weight and
preponderance of the evidence. 438 Relying on Martin v. State439 and White
v. State,44 ° the court of criminal appeals reiterated that it lacked jurisdiction to pass upon such questions of fact. 44 1 In a footnote, the court "perceived" no other standard for use by the courts of appeals than sufficiency
of the evidence to support a conviction. 44 2 Because sufficiency of the evidence review by the court of criminal appeals entails accepting the evidence most favorable to the verdict, without reconciling conflicts or
judging witness credibility, it is a question of law.44 3 As such it is not a
question of fact on which the decision of the court of appeals is final under
article V, section 6. The court concluded that the evidence in Combs's
case, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, sufficiently proved
that the cause of death was drowning; the court, therefore, reversed the
court of appeals' judgment. 4 "
Although ostensibly settled in Combs, the application of article V, section 6 again came into issue in Minor v. State.445 In Minor the court of
appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's
aggravated assault conviction. 44 6 In a lengthy concurrence, Chief Justice
Cadena sought to demonstrate that the court of criminal appeals' decision
in Combs was wrong although not implicated in the case before the
court. 44 7 Justice Cadena argued that article V, section 6 gave the courts of
appeals the authority to review criminal verdicts by the weight and predecision should not be reviewable by
ponderance standard and that44 their
8
the court of criminal appeals.
Minor filed a petition for discretionary review with the court of criminal
436.
1983).
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tax. Crim. App. 1982), aft'd, 652 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.
643 S.W.2d at 714.
Id. at 715.
605 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
591 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
643 S.W.2d at 716.
Id. at 716 n.1.
Id. at 717.
Id at 717-18.
653 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, pet. ref'd).
Id at 351.
Id
Id at 354.
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appeals. The court denied the petition, but in a per curiam opinion dis44 9
cussed the matters raised in Chief Justice Cadena's concurrence below.
The court noted that while article V, section 6 provides that the judgment
of the courts of appeals are final on all questions of fact, that section also
limits their appellate jurisdiction by retaining the language "under such
restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law."' 450 The legislature, as part of the 1981 statutory appellate scheme, modified article 1820
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes to state: "The judgments of the Courts
of Appeals in civil cases shall be conclusive in all cases on the facts of the
case."'45 1 Among other changes, 452 the 1981 legislature also gave the court
of criminal appeals the power to review decisions of the courts of appeals
without limitation. 4 53 From this statutory scheme, the court determined
that the legislature had undertaken to prevent the application of article V,
section 6 to criminal actions.4 54 However, since these issues were not
raised in Minor, the court left unresolved the final question of whether the
courts of appeals may review criminal convictions by a standard other
than in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Abdnor v. Ovard,4 55 an action for a writ of mandamus, gave the court of
criminal appeals an opportunity to consider the standard for determining
an appellant's indigency for purposes of obtaining a free statement of facts
from his trial. The trial court, after a hearing, denied Abdnor a free transcription of the court reporter's notes. 456 Abdnor then sought a writ of
the trial court to
mandamus from the Dallas court of appeals to compel
457
order that he be provided with a statement of facts.
After finding that it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, 458 the
459
court of appeals held that Abdnor had failed to prove his indigency.
The court applied the "firm standard" of indigency outlined in Ex parle
Hennig,460 a Dallas court of civil appeals case involving a civil contempt
order for failure to pay child support. The Hennig test requires that to
demonstrate indigency, a person must prove that he: (1) lacks sufficient
449.
450.
451.
452.

Minor v. State, 657 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (per curiam).
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1820 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id art. 1821 (judgment conclusive on law); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

arts. 4.01, 4.03 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (what courts have criminal jurisdiction; courts of
appeals).
453. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.45(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that
the court of criminal appeals may review a decision of the court of appeals on its own

motion or upon a petition for discretionary review.
454. 657 S.W.2d at 812.
455. 653 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

456. The transcription would have cost the appellant $24,500.
457. 635 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-Dallas, afl'd on other grounds, 653 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1983).
458. 635 S.W.2d at 867. The court of appeals based its finding of mandamus jurisdiction
on TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1823 (Vernon 1964), which states that "[s]aid courts [of
appeals] and the judges thereof may issue writs of mandamus and all other writs necessary
to enforce the jurisdiction of said courts."
459. 635 S.W.2d at 869.
460. 559 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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property that could be sold or mortgaged for the necessary amount; (2) has
unsuccessfully attempted to borrow money from lending institutions; and
(3) knows of no other source, including relatives, from which he could
obtain the sum needed. 46' Although the testimony of Abdnor's father,
who was legal guardian of Abdnor's estate, and of the father's accountant
showed that Abdnor had no known assets to pay for a statement of facts,
the court found no evidence to prove that Abdnor had attempted to borrow the money, or that he did not know of any other source from which he
could obtain the funds.462 The court of appeals held that in the absence of
such463proof the trial court was justified in denying Abdnor indigency status.
The court also implied that Abdnor was required to testify in sup4 64
port of his affidavit of indigency.
On Abdnor's petition for discretionary review, the court of criminal appeals held that the court of appeals erred in imposing the Hennig rule in
criminal appeals, but affirmed the denial of mandamus relief.46 5 The court
determined that the issue of indigency involves consideration of the
financial status of the appellant, not his relatives. 466 The court also wondered how many financial institutions would lend money to an appellant
to pay for a transcript and specifically disapproved the court of appeals'
implication that Abdnor was required to testify at the indigency hear46
ing. 7 Though the court of appeals erred in applying the Hennig standard, however, mandamus was not the appropriate procedure to obtain
should instead be raised in the direct
relief. The court found that the issue
4 68
conviction.
appellant's
of
appeal
Two cases decided by the court of criminal appeals illustrate the confusion in the courts of appeals regarding jurisdiction over appeals from denial of bail. In Beck v. State469 the court of appeals refused to hear an
appeal from the denial of bail in a capital murder case. The court of criminal appeals held that the court of appeals ahd jurisdiction over the matter.470 The appellant's bail had been denied pursuant to article I, section
11 of the Texas Constitution, which gives the right to bail in all cases except capital cases that likely will result in the defendant's receiving the
death penalty. 47 ' Because appellant was under seventeen years of age at
the time of the offense, he could not receive the death penalty4 72 and thus
was entitled to bail. The court of criminal appeals determined that the
461. Id. at 402-03.
462. 635 S.W.2d at 868-69.
463. Id. at 869.

464. Id.The court stated: "We hold that... Abdnor was 'required' to so testify in the
sense that he had the burden to make the showings required by Hennig." Id
465. 653 S.W.2d at 793-94.
466. Id.at 794.
467. id.

468. Id
469. 648 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
470. Id. at 10.
471. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides: "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sure-

ties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident." Id.
472. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984) states: "No person may, in
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court of appeals erroneously relied upon article I, section 1 a, which allows the denial of bail to persons who are habitual offenders, have committed a felony while on bail, or are charged with a felony involving a
deadly weapon following conviction for a prior felony. 473 Denials of bail
under this constitutional provision are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the court of criminal appeals. 474 The appellant's capital murder
case was not, however, within the purview of article I, section 11a4 75and the
court of appeals should have exercised its appellate jurisdiction.
The court of appeals also misinterpreted article I, section 11 a in Exparte
Borgen .476 In Borgen the court of appeals, relying on the jurisdiction limitation in article I, section 1la,4 7 7 refused to consider an appeal from denial
of habeas corpus relief for bail pending appeal. The court of criminal
appeals reversed, holding that bail pending appeal is governed by article
44.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 47 8 not by article I, sections
11 and 11 a of the Constitution, which pertain to preconviction bail. 479 The
courts of appeals are given explicit statutory authority over appeals involvappeal 4 80 and over appeals from denial of
ing denial of bail pending
48 1
habeas corpus relief.
Tonies v. State482 also involved an appeal of a bail matter. Although
otherwise a relatively unimportant case, Tonjes points out a need for legislative action. In Tonies the appellants successfully obtained a reduction in
any case, be punished by death for an offense committed while he was younger than 17
years."
473. TEX. CONST. art. I, § IIa provides:
Any person (1) accused of a felony less than capital in this State, who has been
theretofore twice convicted of a felony, the second conviction being subsequent to the first, both in point of time of commission of the offense and conviction therefore, (2) accused of a felony less than capital in this State,

committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted, or
(3) accused of a felony less than capital in this State involving the use of a
deadly weapon after being convicted of a prior felony, after a hearing, and
upon evidence substantially showing the guilt of the accused of the offense in
(1)or (3) above or of the offenses committed while on bail in (2) above, may
be denied bail pending trial, by a district judge in this State, if said order
denying bail pending trial is issued within seven calendar days subsequent to
the time of incarceration of the accused; provided, however, that if the accused
is not accorded a trial upon the accusation under (1) or (3) above or the accusation and indictment used under (2) above within sixty (60) days from the
time of his incarceration upon the accusation, the order denying bail shall be
automatically set aside, unless a continuance is obtained upon the motion or
request of the accused; provided, further, that the right of appeal to the Court
of Criminal Appeals of this State is expressly accorded the accusedfor a review
of any judgment or order made hereunder, and said appeal shall be given preference by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
(Emphasis added.)
474. Clapp v. State, 639 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
475. 648 S.W.2d at 10.
476. 646 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
477. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 1Ia.
478. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
479. 646 S.W.2d at 451.
480. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(g) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
481. Id art. 44.34.
482. 649 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no pet.).
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the amount of their pretrial bail from the courts of appeals. They then
moved for immediate issuance of the mandate in accordance with the
court's opinion. The court of appeals denied the motion pursuant to article 42.04a of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 483 which prohibits the
court from issuing the mandate until forty-five days from the date of its
ruling. 4 84 Until then the appellants remained restrained under excessive
bail.
The court of appeals' decision means that pretrial detainees may be effectively deprived of bail, even when the bail is excessive, due to the
lengthy delay in issuance of the mandate. The legislature has provided
that habeas corpus appeals are to be acted upon at "the earliest practicable
time.

' 48 5

It is incongruous to require immediate hearing on the appeal,

but leave the appellant to languish in jail even though he has obtained a
bail reduction, because of the time constraints of the normal appellate
timetable. A shorter time period for issuance of the mandate should be
provided in habeas corpus appeals, particularly when the incarcerated appellant is successful.
One issue arising out of the relatively new discretionary review process
is the precedential value of a summary denial of a petition for discretionary review by the court of criminal appeals. The court of criminal appeals
decided this issue in Sheffield v. State.486 In Sheffield the court of criminal
appeals refused appellant's petition for discretionary review from the affirmance of his conviction by the Austin court of appeals. 487 Eschewing
the practice of the Texas Supreme Court in attaching precedential value to
the refusal of review, the court of criminal appeals determined that the
summary refusal of discretionary review does not lend any additional
precedential value to the court of appeals opinion, whether or not the court
of criminal appeals disavows the reasoning of the court of appeals
88
decision.

4

483. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.04a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
484. 649 S.W.2d at 647.
485.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.36 (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides: "Cases of

habeas corpus, taken to the Court of Appeals by appeal . . .shall be heardat the earliest
practicabletime." (Emphasis added.).
486. 650 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
487. Id at 814.
488. Id.

